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ABSTRACT—Innovation is an inherently uncertain process. Success is
typically coupled with risk and we can only hope that those with great ideas
will persevere. To encourage innovation, society reduces some of the
innovation risk through structures like funding systems, regulation, and of
course intellectual property rights. But what happens when uncertainty
strikes the legal protection devices themselves? Faced with unclear rules
and increasingly speculative rewards, some innovators may simply stop
playing the game.
Such uncertainty has recently been a topic of great concern in the U.S.
patent system. Some believe that the suddenly unknowable nature of
fundamental questions like what is patentable has had the effect of
dramatically undermining legal incentives. Others question whether a crisis
really exists. They point out that uncertainty can have positive effects, and
even, be a source of strategic advantage. How can we tell good uncertainty
from bad?
This article provides a novel framework for evaluating patent
uncertainty that explains how complaints and complacency can exist
contemporaneously. It draws on the behavioral economics literature to
provide a deeper understanding of how innovators react to unknown legal
environments. Based on this analysis, the article identifies three different
types of legal uncertainty: (1) investment-killing; (2) if-then; and (3)
remedial uncertainly. It asserts that only the first creates a problem that
must be addressed by legal reform, while the others are actually essential to
a healthy innovation system. The article concludes with specific
prescriptions for addressing negative uncertainty that depend on both firm
and policymaker action.

*

Professor of Business Law and Dean’s Faculty Fellow, Smeal College of Business, Pennsylvania State
University. © 2019 Daniel R. Cahoy. Early versions of this work were presented at the 2018 Atlantic
Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security workshop: “Strategic Foresight, Deep Uncertainty
and Leadership,” and the Academy of Legal Studies in Business 2018 Annual Meeting. The author
appreciates helpful comments from Lynda Oswald, John Duffy, Adam Mossoff, Sean O’Conner, Ted
Sichelman, Lateef Mtima, Eric Claeys, Raghu Garud and Anthony Kwasnica. This research was
supported by the Smeal College of Business Summer Research Program and a 2018 Thomas Edison
Innovation Fellowship.

1

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 2
I. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN INNOVATION ................................................................. 7
A. Uncertainty Matters: An Invention Story ........................................................ 8
B. A Behavioral Economics View on Uncertainty and Decision-Making .......... 11
C. Uncertainty and the Will to Innovate ............................................................ 17
II. THE PROPER UNCERTAINTY ROLE OF LAW AND REGULATION ................................ 23
A. Patents Ideally Reduce the Innovator’s Uncertainty Problem ...................... 23
B. Additional Uncertainty Reduction Mechanisms Support Innovation ............ 29
III. CATEGORIZING NEW UNCERTAINTY ....................................................................... 31
A. Investment Killing Uncertainty: Patentability .............................................. 33
B. If-Then Uncertainty: Obviousness ................................................................ 40
C. Remedial Uncertainty: Fee-Shifting ............................................................. 43
IV. ADDRESSING PATENT UNCERTAINTY ..................................................................... 47
A. Uncertainty Aversion Should Not Substitute for Innovation Policy .............. 47
B. Legal and Regulatory Revision with Care .................................................... 49
C. Firms Must Develop Internal Competencies to Identify and Ameliorate
Uncertainty ................................................................................................... 50
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 53

I spent twenty-two years on the Federal Circuit and nine years since
dealing with patent cases, and I cannot predict in a given case whether
eligibility will be found or not found. If I can’t do it, how can bankers,
venture capitalists, business executives and all of the other players in the
system make reliable predictions and sensible decisions?
Hon. Paul R. Michel (Ret.).1
INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty and innovation go hand-in-hand. Changing consumer
preferences, unforeseen advances in technology, and the shifting sands of
global trade are among the innumerable complicating factors that are
impossible for inventors to predict. To engage in such an endeavor, one
must be comfortable with risk. Thus, society incentivizes risk-taking by
providing limited exclusivity through rights like patents that, in turn,
convey monopoly profits.2 At least, this is the traditional innovation policy
1 The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Hon. Paul R. Michel (Ret.)),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-i
[https://perma.cc/CX9E-B74Y] (advance video to 00:21:46).
2 See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 90–93 (2004) (discussing “patent incentive basics”). For a more
detailed economics view, see SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 34–39 (2004)
(describing the role of intellectual property as the exception to a competitive market in order to
encourage the development of valuable information).
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saw that undergirds the modern intellectual property system. But what
happens when uncertainty strikes the very legal protection devices
themselves? Incentives may suddenly become unclear and the rewards
more speculative. At some point, uncertain rules may simply cause some
innovators to stop playing the game.
This is no idle concern, as there is evidence that intellectual property
uncertainty may be growing. The United States, in particular, has been
singled out for its drift toward unstable and unpredictable standards in such
fundamental areas as patentable subject matter and enforceability. 3
According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “the U.S. is no longer a
global leader [in patent protection] . . . owing to uncertainty over
patentability standards and a relatively low score for opposition
proceedings.”4 The Chamber’s 2018 global index of the environment for
patent rights ranks the U.S. tied for twelfth in the world,5 down significantly
from past years.6 Other voices in the business and inventor community
have reflected similar apprehension.7 The sentiments are worthy of
attention, because they capture rising innovator and investor concern,
which can ultimately impact innovative activity.
Is the anxiety justified? Unfortunately, our traditional policy tools are
not up to the task of assessing whether there really is an uncertainty risk.
Standard legal analysis is consumed with the pursuit of doctrinally correct
3 See, e.g., Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility
Doctrine is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 955–59 (2017)
(explaining that recent uncertainty in obtaining patent rights has undermined innovator incentives to
create and demonstrating a comparative disadvantage between the U.S., Europe, and China); Susan M.
Gerber & A. Patricia Campbell, Patent Eligibility Remains Uncertain, Even After Recent Efforts to
Bring Clarity, LAW.COM (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.law.com/2019/01/11/patent-eligibility-remainsuncertain-even-after-recent-efforts-to-bring-clarity/ [https://perma.cc/6YVP-LQYM]; Russell Slifer,
Weakened Patent System Causes U.S. to Slip as a Global Leader of IP Protection, THE HILL (Aug. 4,
2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/345370-weakened-patent-system-causes-us-toslip-as-a-global-leader-of [https://perma.cc/F397-QQSS].
4 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE’S GLOB. INNOVATION POLICY CTR., CREATE: U.S. CHAMBER
INTERNATIONAL
IP
INDEX
36
(2018),
https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMM4-GRJV].
5 Id.
6 Richard Lloyd, U.S. Patent System Slips Again in Key IP Rankings Ramping Up Pressure on New
USPTO Director, IAM MEDIA (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/us-patentsystem-slips-again-key-ip-rankings-ramping-pressure-new-uspto-director
[https://perma.cc/ML7KD4FP] (observing that the fall to twelfth is a trend downward from previous heights).
7 See Stijepko Tokic, Impact of Legal (Un)certainty on Patent Valuation: What Investors Should
Know Before Investing in Patents, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 363, 365 (2012) (explaining all of the ways that
uncertainty in patentability and enforcement can impact patent value for business investors); Jeffrey
Killian, Can I Hold on Long Enough Until the Madness Stops?, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/09/13/hold-until-madness-stops/id=101095/
[https://perma.cc/Y2UV-FBBN] (describing an inventor’s journey through the patent process with an
invention ultimately ruled “abstract”).

3

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

outcomes,8 or advocating for a strong or weak IP system,9 necessarily
undervaluing the ex-ante impact of uncertainty. Moreover, commentators
typically consider the post hoc intellectual property environment without
necessarily addressing the innovators who are dissuaded from participating.
For example, in a recent statistics-driven article, noted patent academic,
Mark Lemley, reflects on the “resiliency” of the patent system.10 He finds
that, despite concern over bad patents, trolling owners and uncertain
standards, the number of applications continues to go up.11 So do the
number of litigations.12 The natural conclusion is that innovation survives
intact despite uncertainty, but such an assessment cannot count the
inventors who abandoned their activity or chose secrecy rather than the risk
of the patent system.13

8 For example, articles address the doctrinally-correct way to define invention. See, e.g., Kevin
Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1279 (2014)
(considering how contemporary patent doctrine provide a de facto limit on the overreach of patent
protection over pure knowledge); Maximilian R. Petersen, Note, Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Was
it a Patentable Machine or an Unpatentable “Algorithm”? On Principle and Expediency in Current
Patent Law Doctrines Relating to Computer-Implemented Inventions, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 90
(1995) (CCPA doctrine related to the patentability of software). Others consider modifying doctrine in
ways such as adding carve-outs from patent protection. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine
of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (advocating for the addition of a fair use
doctrine in patent law); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine,
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008) (arguing for non-commercial research exemption to patent
infringement doctrine). A recent, broader work describes a more theoretical value for accuracy in patent
law in general, and although this may seem equivalent to uncertainty, the author is actually describing
the impact of mismatched incentives. See Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent
System, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1217, 1258–62 (2017).
9 Compare Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 263 (1995) (arguing that domestic research and development funding will dwindle if patent
rights are weakened, to the benefit of foreign competitors), and George Selgin & John L. Turner, Strong
Steam, Weak Patents, or the Myth of Watt’s Innovation-Blocking Monopoly, Exploded, 54 J.L. & ECON.
841 (2011) (using a corrected story of James Watt’s steam engine patent to counter arguments that
strong patents reduce innovation), with Giovanni Dosi et al., Knowledge, Competition and Innovation:
Is Strong IPR Protection Really Needed for More and Better Innovations?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 471 (2007) (reconsidering the generally held notion that protecting innovators from
competition enhances innovation), and William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents,
54 B.C. L. REV. 1909 (2013) (suggesting that strong U.S. patent rights reduce U.S. competitiveness
globally).
10 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2016).
11 Id. at 14–18.
12 Id. at 19–21.
13 This is not to say that no one has attempted to model the shift. In a fascinating historical study,
economist Petra Moser looked at innovation displayed at the nineteenth-century World’s Fairs. Petra
Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs,
95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214 (2005). She determined that countries without strong patent protection
produced innovation from industries in which patents are less important and secrecy is possible. Id. at
1231–32.
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To truly model the impact of uncertainty, a behaviorist point of view
that considers the pre-investment world of the innovator is required. From
this perspective, patents are innovation incentives only because they are
uncertainty reduction mechanisms.14 And when the patent bargain is
undermined due to ex post revision of the standards and terms, ambiguity
arises, and the promise of uncertainty reduction is less effective. The
system is not only weakened, but rather provides an inconsistent and
unknown pathway that allows others to chaotically capture rights.15
However, a behaviorist view also acknowledges that uncertainty can be
useful at times. An innovator believing that she has superior knowledge of
the future may have a competitive advantage in an uncertain environment.
Because innovation is a process rather than an event,16 one can make
strategic choices in terms of claiming or enforcement that may dissuade
others confronting the unknown. Uncertainty can even be beneficial in
framing remedies that prevent opportunistic actors from behaving
immorally just up to the point of liability.
How can we tell whether the bad uncertainty is overwhelming the
good? This article cuts through the fog by looking at the issue from the
perspective of those who create. It provides a novel framework for
evaluating uncertainty that better explains why complaints and
complacency seem to exist at the same time. The article is a significant
departure from the literature on uncertainty that describes the impact of
uncertain patents,17 uncertain enforcement,18 overall system uncertainty,19 or
14 See, e.g., Dirk Czarnitzki & Andrew A. Toole, Patent Protection, Market Uncertainty, and R&D
Investment, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 147, 151–53 (2011) (considering patent rights as real options and
establishing that patents stimulate R&D investment by reducing a firm’s sensitivity to market
uncertainty).
15 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 6 (2013)
(asserting that Patent Assertion Entities take advantage of uncertainty of claim validity and scope to
force settlements).
16 Raghu Garud et al., Perspectives on Innovation Processes, 7 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 773, 774–
75 (2013) (describing innovation as “more than the emergence of novel ideas”).
17
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with Applications, 96 B.U.
L. REV. 1117 (2016) (discussing patent system uncertainty generally but focusing on resolving
application uncertainty); Emily Michiko Morris, Res or Rules? Patent and the (Uncertain) Rules of the
Game, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 481 (2012) (detailing ambiguity in claim construction
and critiquing the analogies to property deeds); Greg Reilly, Commentary, Completing the Picture of
Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 1353 (2014) (discussing the idea that claim construction
is rendered even more uncertain by Federal Circuit rules); Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent
Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1758 (2011) (describing some benefits in retaining uncertainty
in patent scope).
18 See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court’s
Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 13 (2003) (describing the problem with ascertaining the limits in the doctrine of
equivalents after the Supreme Court’s Warner-Jenkinson case); Gregory J. Wallace, Note, Toward
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simply the idea that unknowns in patent law are bad.20 Rather, it looks to
the behavioral economics literature for clues on how to identify
problematic uncertainty, and actually separate it from beneficial uncertainty
or the inherent risk in innovation. Using this lens, this article for the first
time identifies three different types of legal uncertainty that are likely to
impact innovators: (1) investment-killing uncertainty, (2) if-then
uncertainty, and (3) remedial uncertainty. It asserts that only the first
creates a problem that must be addressed by policy makers and suggests
appropriate action.
Part I describes the nature of innovation and unknowns, explaining
how risk and uncertainty impact the innovation process in both positive and
negative ways. Part II explains how mechanisms like patents are supposed
to work to reduce harmful uncertainty and facilitate innovation. Part III
describes the rise of new legal uncertainty and introduces a framework for
evaluating its effect. The issue of patentable subject matter is highlighted as
a focal point and potential target for reform, but it is contrasted with the
law of obviousness and fee-shifting to demonstrate uncertainty that is less
harmful. Part IV provides a prescriptive outlook on the optimal way to
address ambiguity, at both the policy level and for the firm. In the end, the
article concludes that we cannot—and should not—try to eliminate all
uncertainty in patent law, but we can find a better way to cohabitate.

Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement Cases after Festo and Markman: A Proposal for a
Specialized Patent Trial Court with a Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383 (2004)
(discussing the problem of uncertainty in the outcome of patent cases until the end of the appeal
process).
19 Robert M Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 20-28
(1992) (modeling the utility of risk or quantifiable uncertainty in setting the obviousness standard for
incentivizing the appropriate investment; Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process,
and Patent Law, 43 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1109 (2010) (delineating various sources of uncertainty in
the patent system and suggesting institutional solutions for addressing it); Brian P. Murphy & Daniel P.
Murphy, Bilsky’s “Machine-or-Transformation” Test: Uncertain Prognosis for Diagnostic Methods
and Personalized Medicine Patents, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 755 (2010)
(discussing the uncertain application of a new Federal Circuit test for patentability of business method
patents); Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reducing
Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 191 (2008) (advocating for increased disclosure in software patent applications to increase
certainty in subject matter); Kelly Todd, Note, The Promising Viral Threat to Bacterial Resistance: The
Uncertain Patentability of Phage Therapeutics and the Necessity of Alternative Incentives, 68 DUKE
L.J. 767 (2019) (discussing the uncertainty as to whether phage therapeutics are patentable and the need
for alternative protections in the wake of Alice and Mayo).
20 See generally Alan C. Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH.
103 (2013).

6

17:1 (2019)

Patently Uncertain

I.

RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN INNOVATION

Whether groundbreaking or merely incremental, innovation is a
critical driver of increased productivity on the firm and country level.21
Innovation can be described as the “invention, development, and
implementation of new ideas.”22 Although it is common to think of
innovation as a eureka-like moment that falls upon a prescient inventor or
creator, academics studying the field see a more complex picture. Whereas
the initial invention may correlate with that moment of insight (with a
reduction to something concrete), innovation is the ability to take new ideas
and commercialize or otherwise make them available.23 This rarely is
accomplished by an individual working in isolation.24 Rather, realized
innovation is a non-linear process with many steps, interactions and
contributing stakeholders.25 Embedded in this viewpoint is the idea that
there are systemic attributes that promote innovation, as well as dynamic
and relational properties that shape the path of innovation.26 The process is
something that can be managed and optimized.27 It can also be derailed by
systemic uncertainty.
The presence of uncertainty appears troubling at first. If societal rules
are ill-defined and subject to shifting interpretations, the structure of the
legal system would seem to be weakened.28 This is a natural assumption in
the case of patent law, which many see as reliant on strong property origins
21 Lucia Foster et al., Innovation, Productivity Dispersion, and Productivity Growth, CTR. FOR
ECON.
STUD.
(Feb.2018),
https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2018/CES-WP-18-08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SEX4-QCL4] (reviewing literature linking innovation to productivity growth, but
noting other factors have an influence).
22 Garud et al., supra note 16, at 774. See also Vernon W. Ruttan, Usher and Schumpeter on
Invention, Innovation, and Technological Change, 73 Q.J. ECON. 596, 603 (1959) (reviewing
Schumpeter’s and Usher’s work and concluding that innovation designates “any ‘new thing’ in the area
of science, technology, or art”).
23 Garud et al., supra note 16, at 774–76 (describing literature on innovation processes and their
support of an “evolutionary” perspective on innovation).
24 Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 712–13 (2012) (arguing
that “singletons” are rare kinds of inventions).
25 Consider generally ANDREW H. VAN DER VEN, DOUGLASS E. POLLEY, RAGHU GARUD &
SANKARAN VENKATARAMAN, THE INNOVATION JOURNEY (1999) (reviewing multiple examples of
innovation in a longitudinal study and noting how messy and ad hoc the process can be).
26 See, e.g., Maria Weimer & Luisa Marin, The Role of Law in Managing the Tension between Risk
and Innovation: Introduction to the Special Issue on Regulating New and Emerging Technologies, 7
EUR. J. RISK. REG. 469, 469–70 (2016) (describing generally how law can be viewed as a barrier to
innovation and an important societal protection, and the key is understanding how to accomplish the
latter without the former).
27 Garud et al, supra note 16, at 775.
28 See Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983) (“What is really
undesirable about uncertain rules of law is that they leave persons unsure of their entitlements while
affording unfettered discretion to official decisionmakers.”).
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requiring predictable rules.29 One might presume that any uncertainty in
patent law necessarily reduces innovation incentives, and the cure is to
clarify the rules by rigid statute if necessary.30 However, the impact of
uncertainty in the law is more nuanced, particularly when it applies to the
inherently indefinite area of innovation. To the individual innovator, some
sources of uncertainty may create substantial roadblocks. But others may
be neutral or even spur innovation. A single-minded effort to eliminate
legal uncertainty could be counterproductive, and it is therefore, useful to
consider its broader role in innovator decision making.
It is useful to first appreciate how uncertainty can manifest as an
innovation problem. With that in mind, it is possible to unpack the nature
of uncertainty in innovation and identify the attributes that define its impact
on an individual inventor or firm. A behavioral economics approach
appropriately grounds such an assessment. From this more contextualized
understanding, the idealized role of patent legal instruments is apparent, as
well as the negative impacts when they are the source of uncertainty.
A. Uncertainty Matters: An Invention Story
Despite the inherent risks in innovation, participants in the system
count on some predictability and certainty in legal structures to justify their
investments. When patent certainty is undermined, the benefits of playing
the innovation game are threatened. Consider the case of Dr. Francesco
Pompei and his forehead thermometer, an invention that may not have
transformed medical science, but surely made life with a minor illness just
a bit better.31

29 See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697, 717–27 (2001) (describing the role of property in creating incentives for follow-on
commercialization in addition to the initial invention); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (explaining that there are reasons that patents
should not be fully analogized to physical property).
30
For example, the Intellectual Property Owner’s Association (IPO) and the American Intellectual
Property Organization (AIPLA) have made a joint proposal for a wholesale replacement of the part of
the patent statute that is the source of uncertainty on patentable subject matter. Joint AIPLA-IPO
Proposal on Patent Eligibility, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, https://www.aipla.org/policyadvocacy/legislative/joint-aipla-ipo-proposal-on-patent-eligibility [https://perma.cc/QJ9M-6FD3]. It
advocates for defined and cabined exceptions. Id.
31 See About Exergen Corporation, EXERGEN CORP., https://www.exergen.com/about-us/aboutexergen-corporation [https://perma.cc/7N87-9JM6] (describing the history of Exergen, founded on its
temporal artery thermometer invented by Francesco Pompei). This example was inspired by a post by
Dennis Crouch on his excellent website, Patently-O. Dennis Crouch, Eligible: Method of Measuring
Body Temperature, PATENTLY-O.COM (March 9, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/03/eligiblemeasuring-temperature.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=
Feed%3A+PatentlyO+%28Dennis+Crouch%27s+Patently-O%29 [https://perma.cc/5MBA-UVC8].
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In 1998, Dr. Pompei, a researcher associated with Harvard
University,32 invented a method for measuring body temperature based on
heat flow at the surface of the forehead.33 Existing thermometer technology
depended on invasive techniques that required some bodily enclosure.34 The
most advanced (and least objectionable) alternatives at the time—eardrum
or underarm thermometers—still required some intrusion into the body. Dr.
Pompei’s idea of using the temporal artery as an infrared measurement site
and comparing it to ambient temperature to obtain an accurate body
temperature was radical and not readily accepted by the medical
community.35 But such a non-invasive technique was highly desired by
patients and significant market interest was evident.36 In order to convince
physicians and regulators that his methods were medically reliable and
establish that a marketable product could be produced with the idea, Dr.
Pompei was required to undertake significant investments of time and
money.37 Such investments would only be reasonable if he could retain
some control over the invention in the future.
Thus, Dr. Pompei filed for a patent on a “Temporal Artery
Temperature Detector,” which was eventually granted and issued in 2001.38
With this, and several other related patents, he built a highly successful
firm called Exergen to manufacture and sell non-invasive thermometers.39
According to the company’s materials, the thermometers are used in half of
U.S. hospitals and are in the hands of over four million consumers.40 Such
success breeds competition, and other firms have an obvious interest in
using Dr. Pompei’s patented methods to carve out their own portions of this
32 Dr. Pompei has been profiled as a successful entrepreneur related to his work in non-invasive
thermography. See Allyson Every, Father and Son Tackle Heat, Sound, MIT TECH. REV. (June 1,
2005),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/404219/father-and-son-tackle-heat-sound/
[https://perma.cc/7YAV-Q6PJ].
33 Exergen’s Opposition to Brookland’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity Under 35
U.S.C. § 101 at 2–3, Exergen Corp. v. Brooklands, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 307 (D. Mass. 2015)
[hereinafter Exergen’s Opposition].
34 Id. at 5.
35 Amy Norton, Accuracy of Forehead-Scanning Thermometers Doubted, REUTERS (Aug. 10,
2007),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thermometers-idUSPAR05104120070810.
[https://perma.cc/9PVC-J7BS].
36 Karel Allegaert et al., Tympanic, Infrared Skin, and Temporal Artery Scan Thermometers
Compared with Rectal Measurement in Children: A Real-Life Assessment, 76 CURRENT THERAPEUTIC
RES. 34, 36 (2014) (describing the desire for non-invasive thermometers in the treatment of children,
and noting that, while all are second-best, temporal artery scans are closest to traditional methods).
37 Exergen’s Opposition, supra note 33, at 6. See also About Exergen Corporation, supra note 31.
38 U.S. Pat. No. 6,292,685 (issued Sept. 18, 2001).
39 See About Exergen Corporation, supra note 31 (“Exergen holds over 100 issued and pending
U.S. and foreign patents . . . .”).
40 Id.
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valuable market. Thanks to his patents, Dr. Pompei could expect a
continued return on his investment . . . unless it turns out that Dr. Pompei
did not claim a patentable invention.
In two cases, one against Brooklands, Inc. and the other against
Thermomedics, Inc., separate district courts ruled that a continuation of the
original patent41 was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for claiming a natural
phenomenon with no inventive step.42 One of the invalid claims, no. 51,
reads:
A method of detecting human body temperature comprising: measuring
temperature of a region of skin of the forehead; and processing the measured
temperature to provide a body temperature approximation based on heat flow
from an internal body temperature to ambient temperature.43

According to the two district courts, the “measuring” and “processing”
aspects of the claims added nothing inventive.44
However, a third, contemporaneous case against another defendant,
Kaz, yielded a completely different result. That case involved the following
claim from the same patent, claim no. 14:
A method of detecting human body temperature comprising: making at least
three radiation readings per second while moving a radiation detector to scan
across a region of skin over an artery to electronically determine a body
temperature approximation, distinct from skin surface temperature.45

The district court in that case found that, although the steps beyond
the natural phenomenon were generally known, they were not “well
understood or routine” in the context of measuring body temperature.46
In an unpublished opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Kaz court’s determination that the patent was not
invalid.47 The claims at issue in these two cases are extremely similar, and
41

U.S. Pat. No. 7,787,938 (issued Aug. 31, 2010).
Exergen Corp. v. Brooklands Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 307, 312–17 (D. Mass. 2015); Exergen Corp.
v. Thermomedics, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 200, 203–08 (D. Mass. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Exergen Corp. v.
Sanomedics Int’l Holdings, Inc., 653 F. App’x 760 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
43 U.S. Pat. No. 7,787,938 (issued Aug. 31, 2010).
44 Exergen Corp., 125 F. Supp. 3d at 317 (“Measuring temperature or radiation is simply not an
inventive or unconventional step in the field of thermometry”); Exergen Corp., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 208
(“The asserted claims lack an inventive concept outside of the laws of nature and are not eligible for
patent protection.”).
45 U.S. Pat. No. 7,787,938 (issued Aug. 31, 2010). The actual claim that was litigated at the district
court level and appealed was claim 24, which was dependent on claim 14. Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA,
Inc., 725 F. App’x 959, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2018). This means that the case involved claim 14 with the
additional limitation that the artery referred to in the claim is a temporal artery. Id.
46 Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 366, 371 (D. Mass. 2016).
42
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the difference in validity appears to rest on what is sufficient to transform
an otherwise unpatentable phenomenon into a protectable invention. In
dissent, Judge Hughes argued that the district court erred because, “Rather
than finding that the claim elements were not routine or conventional, [it]
focused on whether those elements were routinely or conventionally used
for the purpose of calculating core body temperature.”48 This is arguably a
different legal test than prescribed by precedent. In fact, Judge Hughes
noted that the Federal Circuit had rejected such a test in an earlier case.49
Two invalidations and one not-invalid verdict over three cases, all in
the District of Massachusetts. How is an innovator expected to navigate
such a mix of derived-on-the-fly tests, years before the invention is
litigated? Following a substantial investment of time and materials, as well
as a commitment to disclosure through the patent system. Dr. Pompei and
Exergen were ultimately left with no real basis for valuing the risk. They
could only look forward to an uncertain legal environment and hope for the
best. A less committed innovator might not opt for such a challenge, and
the world might be worse off.
It is cases like Dr. Pompei’s that worry many in the intellectual
property community, particularly small inventors. His invention is not a
mere arrangement for taking pictures against a white background50 or a
method of swinging on a swing,51 but a rather a concrete, useful advance in
medical technology. A larger entity may be in a better position to fund a
risky patent application or negotiate with the examiner.52 But those without
such protection may abandon a project or rely on secrecy.53 Thus, the key
question: to prevent a suboptimal outcome, how much do we need to
protect the “Dr. Pompeis” of the world from uncertainty?
B. A Behavioral Economics View on Uncertainty and Decision-Making
Uncertainty imbues every decision about the future to some extent.
There are so many factors that can impact what will eventually occur that
no one can move ahead with complete security. But not all unknowns
confronted by decision-makers are equal. Some can be characterized in
47

Exergen Corp., 725 F. App’x at 966–67.
Id. at 975.
49 Id.
50 U.S. Pat. No. 8,676,045 (issued Mar. 18, 2014).
51 U.S. Pat. No. 6,368,227 (issued Apr. 9, 2002).
52 Professor Lemley has argued that one should not focus on incentivizing a particular inventor,
since few advances depend on one person. Lemley, supra note 24, at 712–13. Rather, we are
incentivizing patent races. Id. at 750–51. Regardless, the impact of uncertainty in dissuading an
individual or participants of a race may not be significantly different.
53 Moser, supra note 13, at 1231–32.
48
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terms of probability and effectively managed, while others may be so
fraught with undefined radicals and factors as to defy conception. Some
may arise through the actions of the decision-maker, while others may be
generated by outside forces. Some may involve issues present before or at
the time of investment, yet others may arise after costs have been sunk. At
base, uncertainty can be positive or negative, depending on the nature and
context. This rich environment of uncertainty means that there is no onesize-fits-all solution or path. Not every uncertainty must be resolved, and a
misaligned system for addressing uncertainty can actually create more
problems than it solves.
In conceptualizing the nature of unknowns, there is perhaps no more
cited academic than economist Frank Knight. He is credited with
articulating the difference between risk and true uncertainty that has helped
guide modern analysis of innovation and business decision-making.54
According to Professor Knight, risk exists when the future is unknown, but
the probabilities of the future outcomes can be assessed with certainty.55
With this knowledge, one can reasonably decide on the best path, even if
there are many possible outcomes. When those outcomes have a financial
impact, one can value each path based on the probabilities and an
appropriate time-related discount.56 This is the basis of many business
valuation techniques.57 It is also well represented by decision tree analysis,
which attempts to place a value on decision “nodes” according to the
probability of receiving payoffs along different paths.58
On the other hand, true uncertainty exists when one cannot even
identify the systems or factors that would give rise to the probabilities of
future outcomes.59 As Donald Rumsfeld famously declared in the wake of
the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, these are “unknown
unknowns.”60 Without an understanding of how the future could shift, it is
essentially impossible to know with any confidence the risk of any
particular path. Professor Knight describes states in which some of these

54 See Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 903 (2011) (explaining Knight’s
contribution to understanding risk and uncertainty).
55 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 233 (1921) (reprinted 1964).
56 Id.
57 GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY &
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 165 (3d ed. 2000).
58 See David Teece & Sohvi Leih, Uncertainty, Innovation and Dynamic Capabilities: An
Introduction, 58 CAL. MGMT. REV., no. 4, 2016, at 5, 8 fig.1 (graphically depicting the difference
between risk and uncertainty using a decision tree as compared to radiating probability questions).
59 KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 233–34.
60 Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Philip Stephens, The Unwitting Wisdom of Rumsfeld’s
Unknowns, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2003, at 19.
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uncertainties could be grouped, such that paths could be broadly assessed,
but he noted that there are states of uncertainty that are incapable of even
this level of analysis.61
To be fair, Knight’s risk/uncertainty distinction has been criticized for
lack of relevance in the real world.62 On paper, it seems reasonable to
qualify some issues as being solvable through probability analysis, but in
fact, reality is almost always more complicated. Any determination about
the future implicates a number of systems that are hard to fully ascertain.
Moreover, when other actors are involved, biases and heuristics make
human behavior inherently uncertain. Thus, it has been suggested that
nearly everything beyond lotteries and casino gambling is a question of
uncertainty, not risk.63 But this criticism, while technically correct, does not
capture the distinction Knight intended. He was comparing issues that we
can reasonably wrap our heads around leading to informed decisions with
those that have too many unknown variables, and for which, we have only
“partial knowledge.”64 This is a distinction that realistically impacts
individuals and firms.
Other economists have discussed the existence of uncertainty in
business decision-making, often in the context of financial markets. John
Maynard Keynes, for example, reflected Knight’s distinction between risk
and uncertainty and noted that investment decisions are typically made
under conditions of uncertainty.65 Keynes also noted that there are
differences in individuals regarding their uncertainty preferences, and
entrepreneurs are often more willing to move forward with a lack of
knowledge.66
Although unknowns cannot be avoided, classical economists have
traditionally assumed that individuals and firms can still behave rationally.
If one does not know exactly which probability distribution among many
61

KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 238–240.
See Geoffrey T.F. Brook, Uncertainty, Profit and Entrepreneurial Action: Frank Knight’s
Contribution Reconsidered, 32 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 221, 226 (2010) (“Risk refers only to instances
where there is certainty about the distribution of possible outcomes, and this certainty exists only in the
textbook theories of perfect competition.”).
63 Id.
64 Richard N. Langlois & Metin M. Cosgel, Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and the Firm: a
New Interpretation, 31 ECON. ENQUIRY 456, 459–60 (1993) (explaining the meaning of Knight’s
distinction between risk and uncertainty).
65 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 355–56 (1921).
66 Richard A. Posner, Keynes and Coase, 54 J.L. & ECON. S31, S37 (2011) (comparing an
entrepreneur’s willingness to take “noncalculable risks” to others of equal intelligence by setting forth
“empirical evidence that economic growth is indeed . . . positively correlated with tolerance for
uncertainty (low uncertainty aversion) and, a closely related point, that entrepreneurs are less averse to
uncertainty than are other persons.”).
62
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will result from a decision, one can still engage in rational decision making
using one’s own subjective expected utility (SEU).67 Using this model,
individuals determine subjective probabilities based on their knowledge
and make the move that results in the highest individual utility given the
probabilities.68 It does not matter if the individual does not actually know
which probability distribution applies. This is obviously a model that
depends on some conception of potential probabilities. When probabilities
associated with outcomes knowingly cannot be determined at all,
behavioral economists would argue that irrationality will at times prevail.
To distinguish the specific kind of uncertainty that is not amenable to
subjective expected utility theory, economists use the term “ambiguity.”69
Ambiguity is a situation in which an individual has no basis for assessing
future outcomes because, essentially, the games that will be played are
unknown.70 Daniel Ellsberg described this state in 1961 as a situation that
cannot be resolved with subjective expected utility, demonstrating instead
that ambiguity leads to irrational behavior.71 The field of behavioral
economics owes much to this work. Unfortunately, the terms uncertainty
and ambiguity are frequently interchanged outside of formal economics, so
it is important to keep in mind the basic premise of Ellsberg’s ambiguity:
inability to determine the probabilities that exist.72
Given the nature of missing information in ambiguity scenarios, the
state is often temporal. In other words, as one gains additional knowledge,
particularly about probabilities of occurrence, aspects of ambiguity
disappear, and the choices become clearer. This is analogous to Bayesian
updating in expected utility,73 in that subsequent information is used to
revise previous estimates of figure probabilities.74 In some cases, it may be
possible for a decision maker to engage in efforts to attain the missing
information or realign the decision after the conditions become more
evident. But for decisions that must take place at a particular time period,

67

LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 6–9 (1954).
Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty
and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY, 325, 326 (1992).
69 David Dequech, Fundamental Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 26 EASTERN ECON. J., 41, 45 (2000).
70 See Stefan T. Trautmann, Ferdinand M. Vieder, & Peter P. Wakker, Causes of Ambiguity
Aversion: Known Versus Unknown Preferences, 36 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 225, 225 (2008)
(differentiating risk from ambiguity).
71 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643, 656–67 (1961).
72 Id.
73 Gary Charness & Dan Levin, When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of
Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1300, 1300 (2005).
74 Id.
68
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against information that will only be available ex post, the impact of the
ambiguity will be present.
Significantly, the very existence of uncertainty or ambiguity can be a
disincentive in and of itself. The description and study of this negative
impact of the unknown is an important area of behavioral economics.
Termed “ambiguity aversion,” it is the idea that individuals will avoid
economically rational choices when uncertainty is present, or at least
require an uncertainty premium.75 Ellsberg is credited with identifying this
phenomenon.76 His work employed a game theoretic approach to
demonstrate the behavior subjects exhibit in the face of ambiguity that
manifests in a kind of conservatism that protects against the worst-case
scenario.77 It violates subjective utility theory.78 Even explaining the
rational choice to a subject will not necessarily dispel the aversion.79
Certainly, this behavior will not occur every time there is an unknown. But
it explains that individuals are not always operating on some sense of the
probabilities of future outcome and that uncertainty should have
measurable effects.
In the wake of Ellsberg’s work, multiple studies have confirmed that
ambiguity aversion is a real behavioral phenomenon and have added
multiple dimensions.80 For example, subjects will pay a premium to avoid
ambiguity.81 They will respond with more aversion when the range of
probabilities increases.82 And they do not appear to be reacting to the
psychology that some hostile bias is creating the ambiguity—the ambiguity
itself is the factor underlying the aversion.83

75 David Weisbach, Introduction: Legal Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty, 44 J. LEGAL
STUD. S319, S322 (2015) (“Only by increasing the payoffs for the ambiguous bet can individuals be
made indifferent.”).
76 Id. at S321.
77 Ellsberg, supra note 71, at 646.
78 See SAVAGE, supra note 67.
79 Weisbach, supra note 75, at S323.
80 See JOHN H. KAGEL & ALVIN E. ROTH, HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 646 (1995)
(summarizing various studies); Camerer & Weber, supra note 68, at 333–37 (surveying experiments on
ambiguity).
81 Shawn P. Curley & J. Frank Yates, An Empirical Evaluation of Descriptive Models of Ambiguity
Reactions in Choice Situations, 33 J. MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOL. 397, 397 (1989); Michele Bernasconi
& Graham Loomes, Failures of the Reduction Principle in an Ellsberg-Type Problem, 32 THEORY &
DECISION 77, 96 (1992).
82 Shawn P. Curley & J. Frank Yates, The Center and Range of the Probability Interval as Factors
Affecting Ambiguity Preferences, 36 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 273, 284
(1985).
83 Shawn P. Curley, J. Frank Yates & Richard A. Abrams, Psychological Sources of Ambiguity
Avoidance, 38 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 230, 252 (1986).
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Ambiguity or uncertainty has even been demonstrated to have real
world consequences beyond the laboratory. Professors Camerer and Weber
collected and summarized a number of studies and showed that uncertainty
is impactful in medicine and health; insurance, liability and taxes;
marketing; and financial markets.84 In particular, studies show that markets
have specific reactions to uncertainty that are distinguishable from those
resulting in new valuation or risk information. For example, Caballero and
Krishnamurthy describe “flight to quality” episodes—moving risky
investment to safer investments—following economic crises that present an
unanticipated form of Knightian uncertainty.85 Essentially, investors
anticipate the worst-case scenario posed by the uncertainty and become
overly conservative, reducing market liquidity. The fact that such episodes
are fairly unique to the time and nature of each crisis suggests that these are
not merely reactions to increased risk. Similarly, Cao, Wang and Zhang
find that average individuals avoid participating in the stock market when
there is dispersed uncertainty about market payoffs.86
Daniel Farber described the phenomenon of uncertainty in the
regulatory context (particularly environmental harm).87 He notes that the
distinction between risk and unascertainable uncertainty or ambiguity
applies here as well, and describes the fact that regulators prefer to ignore it
and individuals try to avoid it.88 Farber explains that a well-established
model for predicting the impact of uncertainty is the so-called, “α”maxmin,” which suggests that individuals can overweight the possibility
of bad consequences (worst possible outcome) when the upside is not
great.89 The natural result of this aversion is the precautionary principle,
which compels action to reduce harm even when the potential for bad
outcomes is uncertain.90
The fact that ambiguity or uncertainty has impact may be established,
but one must consider how it is particularly relevant in the context of
innovation. The remaining parts of this article make this application.
However, for the sake of clarity and consistency with the existing legal

84

Camerer & Weber, supra note 68, at 353–357.
Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Collective Risk Management in a Flight to
Quality Episode, 63 J. FIN. 2195, 2195 (2008).
86 H. Henry Cao, Tan Wang & Harold H. Zhang, Model Uncertainty, Limited Market Participation
and Asset Prices, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 1219, 1241–42 (2005).
87 Farber, supra note 54.
88 Id. at 909–11, 928–29.
89 Id. at 929–30.
90 Id. at 914–15, 930.
85
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literature,91 it will favor the use of the term “uncertainty,” rather than
“ambiguity,” to describe future unknowns that cannot be defined
probabilistically. This is an important lexicographic distinction because the
present article deals with patents, and the term ambiguity has a specific
meaning there. As language-based rights they include a rich literature on
the problems with claims qualified as “ambiguous,” a completely different
use of the term.92 “Uncertainty” is a better term for the non-ascertainable
probability context addressed in this article.93
C. Uncertainty and the Will to Innovate
Many uncertainties confront the particular world of innovators. It
might be uncertain whether one can obtain funding to carry out research
and development to perfect a product.94 The availability of important raw
materials may depend on environmental, political and legal environments
that are unclear at the time of invention;95 how the market will perceive the
innovation, particularly if it has social implications;96 and, of course,
whether it will be possible to negotiate the legal and regulatory structures
may be extremely relevant, depending on the type of innovation.
Successful firms must manage such unknowns and it shapes their decisionmaking. And in some cases, the lack of knowledge about the future may
present an insurmountable barrier and dissuade some set of actors. If
innovations lost as a result could be contributors to important social goals
(medical advances, efficient energy, agricultural productivity, space
exploration, etc.), managing or minimizing negative unknowns becomes

91 For example, the most common use of the term “ambiguity” in the legal literature is to describe
unclear language rather than probabilities of future events. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed., 2019).
92 See, e.g., Oskar Liivak, The Unresolved Interpretative Ambiguity of Patent Claims, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1851, 1862–65 (2016) (describing the problem of claim ambiguity).
93 However, the use of “ambiguity” in economics articles should be appreciated for crossreferencing the literature in that field.
94 Jesper Lindgaard Christensen, The Role of Finance in National Systems of Innovation, in
NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: TOWARD A THEORY OF INNOVATION AND INTERACTIVE
LEARNING 151, 162–63 (Bengt-Ake Lundvall, ed. 2010) (describing how stable finance reduces
uncertainty).
95 This has become a particularly important issue for consumer electronics that use so-called
“conflict minerals.” See, e.g., Shannon Raj, Note, Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and
the Legislation that Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981 (2011).
96 Garud, et al., supra note 16, at 795–96 (referring to the phenomenon of “cultural complexity,”
which relates to a product’s acceptance as dependent on social norms and structure).
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relevant for national innovation policy.97 Thus, uncertainty in the context of
innovation seems particularly daunting.98
Or is it? Will uncertainty in any one of these areas actually dissuade
an innovator, as opposed to another type of investor or market actor?
Moreover, would it be preferable to eliminate all of these uncertainties if
that were possible? It is one thing to say that unknowns can produce
ambiguity aversion effects in the lab or financial markets, but it is not a
given that uncertainty always (or even frequently) dissuades innovators. In
other words, even if uncertainty or ambiguity has a real negative impact in
some cases, in others, parties can likely navigate through it or even see it as
an opportunity.
Notably, Knight did not consider uncertainty to necessarily be a bad
thing in the context of innovators. In fact, he believed that an entrepreneur
must act on uncertainty in order to attain profit (which Knight defined as
the surplus that one might attain after factoring in understood investment
risks).99 Only one who acts in a state of uncertainty has the opportunity to
take what others cannot and achieve something beyond what is possible in
a state of perfect competition.100 Keynes also noted that moving ahead in
the face of uncertainty is a characteristic of certain business people as they
employ what he termed their “animal spirits.”101 Even Joseph Schumpeter,
whose work is often considered in contrast to Knight and Keynes, could be
read to support the notion that some level of uncertainty is necessary for the
creative destruction carried out by entrepreneurs.102 The appropriate

97

See generally NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: TOWARD A THEORY OF INNOVATION AND
INTERACTIVE LEARNING (Bengt-Ake Lundvall, ed. 2010).
98 Engaging in a systematic literature review, Harri Jalonen attempted to categorize all of the types
of uncertainty that impact innovation. Harri Jalonen, The Uncertainty of Innovation: A Systematic
Review of the Literature, 4 J. MGMT. RES. E12 (2012). Jalonen derived eight general categories: 1)
technological uncertainty, 2) market uncertainty, 3) regulatory/institutional uncertainty, 4)
social/political uncertainty, 5) acceptance/legitimacy uncertainty, 6) managerial uncertainty, 7) timing
uncertainty, and 8) consequence uncertainty.
99 KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 271.
100 See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1785–86 (2004)
(discussing profit in terms of the residual’s claim over the return on risk); Stephen F. LeRoy & Larry D.
Singell, Knight on Risk and Uncertainty, 95 J. POL. ECON. 394, 396–97 (1987).
101 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
161 (1936).
102 Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can do About It, 28 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 817, 822 (2007) (“A central premise in Schumpeter’s theory—which is the focus of this
article—is that entrepreneurs have special skills for innovation and for dealing with uncertainty,
although the latter quality is relatively less prominent in Schumpeter’s account.”) See generally Maria
Brouwer, Entrepreneurship and Uncertainty: Innovation and Competition among the Many, 15 SMALL
BUS. ECON. 149 (2000).
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diffusion of innovation, time of entry, and necessary finance are arguably
propelled by some level of uncertainty.103
Against the theory that uncertainty can be positive in some cases,
there is not surprisingly evidence of its negative impacts on innovation as
well. For example, using matched patent data for firms innovating during
the Great Depression, Malhar Nabar and Tom Nicolas show that high
initial uncertainty reduced innovative activity, but firms that were able to
update expectations recovered.104 Additionally, Minna Allarakhia and
Anthony Wensely argue that uncertainty surrounding the availability of
patent rights and the blocking potential of early entrants created
disincentives for innovation in the emerging field of systems biology.105
Harri Jalonen cites many other examples, and further argues that the overall
gist of the literature is that uncertainty has negative innovative effects.106
How should one reconcile these different concepts of uncertainty?
One insight is that there is likely to be a personality component to this
question. Some innovators may embrace a given uncertainty while others
look for safer alternatives. Judge Richard Poser articulated the concept of
differential behaviors in an essay written in the midst of the 2008 financial
crisis, wherein he considered responses to an economic depression.107 He
noted that it is not necessarily irrational to ignore some uncertainty, as
much as it is a representation of a utility function that maximizes other
benefits from a course of action.108 According to Judge Posner:
People respond to uncertainty aversion in a variety of ways—trying to
transform it into calculable risk when they can do so, as by improving
analytical techniques or gathering additional information, and, when they
cannot do so, substituting other methods of decision making for cost-benefit
analysis, such as simple extrapolation from the past, decision according to
rules of thumb, imitation of other people, minimizing sunk costs, flipping a
coin, seeking guidance in prayer, adopting a “safety-first” policy, and building

103

E.g., Brouwer, supra note 102, at 153 (“[U]ncertainty about the time of entry arrival and
incumbents’ retreat prompts entrants to set price equal to incumbents’ marginal cost. Uncertainty thus
needs to be inserted in a Schumpterian model in order to achieve [these results].”).
104 Malhar Nabar & Tom Nicholas, Uncertainty and Innovation During the Great Depression,
Harvard Business School Working Paper (Jan. 14, 2010), http://people.hbs.edu/tnicholas/ui.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4MF-U6NJ].
105 Minna Allarakhia and Anthony Wensley, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights in
Systems Biology, 23 NATURE BIOTECH. 1485 (2005).
106 See Jalonen, supra note 98, at 7 (reviewing dozens of innovation/uncertainty articles and
concluding “an overwhelming majority of the reviewed literature has perceived uncertainty to be
detrimental to, or problematic for, innovation.”).
107 Richard A. Posner, Uncertainty Aversions and Economic Depressions, 52 CHALLENGE 25
(2009).
108 Id. at 31.
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relations of trust (often within the family) in order to create a form of
insurance that does not rely on the calculation of premiums. A legal system
can reduce uncertainty by, for example, requiring compensation for the taking
of property by the government, since such takings are uncertain events.109

He further argues that the optimal government response in the face of
a crisis is not necessarily to reform, but to reduce uncertainty (particularly
if the reform itself introduces uncertainty).110
To be sure, although responses to uncertainty may be distributed, they
are likely not random. Some communities may have uncertainty aversion
traits in common. For example, there is significant literature supporting the
idea that entrepreneurs are more likely to move forward in the face of
uncertainty than others.111 Unfortunately, while evidence of differences
among personality types gives some clue as to who is likely to respond to
uncertainty, it does not necessarily help identify whether the overall effect
is positive, neutral or negative. Can we know prospectively that a given
uncertainty has the potential to blunt innovative activity?
At base, it should be possible to make some conclusions about impact
related to the magnitude or significance of the uncertainty. In other words,
to what degree will the uncertainty impact the future? For example,
whether it will be sunny or rainy on the day of a prospective product launch
may be uncertain six months out, but this eventuality is unlikely to have
much impact on innovative effort. However, other uncertainties, such as the
existence of competing products or the regulatory environment, play into
exactly how uncertainty impacts innovation. Again, without more, whether
the swing will be positive or negative is not clear.
To answer the impact question, one should look to research in the
field of behavioral economics. Here, the attributes of uncertainties that are
more likely to play a dissuading role are apparent. Consider that Heath and
Tversky found that subjects preferred uncertainty over chance when they
believed they were more knowledgeable about the ambiguous subject
matter.112 Their experiments concerned uncertainty about events, such as
presidential elections and pro football games, and when subjects had
confidence about their information—competence in the form of knowledge,
skill and comprehension—they elected to move ahead in spite of the
109

Id.
Id. at 38.
111 See Jeffrey S. McMullen & Dean A. Shepherd, Entrepreneurial Action and the Role of
Uncertainty in the Theory of the Entrepreneur, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 132, 139 (2006) (reviewing the
literature regarding the motivations of entrepreneurs in the face of uncertainty and offering the synthesis
that entrepreneurs differ in their “willingness to bear perceived uncertainty”).
112 Chip Heath & Amos Tversky, Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice
Under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 21–22 (1991).
110
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uncertainty.113 And subsequently, Craig Fox and Amos Tversky found that
a crucial factor in subjects’ confidence was that they were comparatively
more or less informed about another option.114 In other words, uncertainty
aversion exists when they are comparatively less ignorant about another
event.115
To be clear, the reason uncertainty produces an aversion is that
subjects apparently consider the worst possible outcome and work to avoid
it.116 One could argue that the precautionary principle is one iteration of
such a response, wherein regulators presume a highly negative outcome in
withholding approval.117 In the context of innovation, the worst possible
outcome related to intellectual property might be that funds are spent, time
is wasted and no rights are obtained. Considering that possibility, one who
is averse to the relevant uncertainty or ambiguity might simply avoid the
game.
In a different stream of research on risk preferences (rather than
uncertainty per se), there is evidence that people react more strongly to
sunk costs or loss of ownership than they do to the potential for gain.
Termed the “endowment effect,” it was articulated most prominently by
Richard Thaler (but was conceptually present in earlier descriptions of loss
aversion).118 In other words, once people have something, they fear losing it
more than they value an equivalent gain.119 This phenomenon may be
reflected in Caballero and Krishnamurthy’s work, where ownership of
securities subsequently and surprisingly worth less fueled a retreat from
investment.120
By connecting the behavioral literature to the innovation problem, it is
possible to finally define the aspects of uncertainty that are positive and

113

Id. at 22–23.
Craig Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q. J. ECON.
585 (1995).
115 Id. at 599.
116 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 146–52 (2007) (describing the thought process
generally as an application of the “maximin” principle in the face of uncertainty).
117 See Oren Perez, Precautionary Governance and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge: A
democratic Framework for Regulating Nanotechnology, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 29, 33–36
(2010) (describing the theory in the context of regulation). But see Nabil I. Al-Najjar, A Bayesian
Framework for the Precautionary Principle, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S337 (2015) (arguing that the
precautionary principle can be fit into standard subjective expected utility analysis).
118 Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON BEHAVIOR & ORG.
39, 44 (1980). See also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POLITICAL ECON. 1325, 1326–28 (1990)
(describing the origin of the theory).
119 Thaler, supra note 118, at 44.
120 Caballero & Krishnamurthy, supra note 85.
114
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negative. When (1) an innovator has no competence and (2) sunk costs are
affected, the impact is more likely to be negative. This is particularly true if
an alternative path exists that will avoid the uncertainty (e.g., secrecy, in
the context of invention). The issue can be more easily understood if
depicted in a bi-matrix:
FIG. 1: LEGAL OR REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY IMPACT

On the other hand, where there is either some level of competence or
there is no future impact on investments from a decision, it is reasonable to
presume that some amount of strategic opportunity exists. This is where we
find entrepreneurs engaging their “animal spirits.”121 A risk-taking firm or
individual can leverage its partial knowledge or protection over lesser
qualities of others. And finally, if neither incompetence nor ex post
investment impact exists, there should be no uncertainty impact. A rule or
regulation existing in the context should have literally no relevance to an
innovator and will not dissuade any player from moving ahead.
Even if policymakers do not entirely conceptualize the above
behavioral matrix when setting up innovations systems, we do have a
general idea that law and regulation moderate uncertainty. Essentially, we
transform uncertainty into risk. This is particularly true in the innovation
world, where patents especially can be viewed as uncertainty reduction
mechanisms, or at least, this is the case when law and regulation is
functioning properly.
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II. THE PROPER UNCERTAINTY ROLE OF LAW AND REGULATION
In order to evaluate rising legal and regulatory uncertainty, it is
important to acknowledge how our existing system attempts to manage the
unknown. Given the fact that uncertainty or ambiguity has the potential to
detract from desirable (and socially useful) innovative behavior, it is
reasonable to have counteracting mechanisms in place that address relevant
unknowns. But because not every uncertainty is problematic, we are
selective to ensure that the opportunity for competition and profit is
maintained. Moreover, the goal is often to transform the uncertainty or
ambiguity to risk, such that there is an ascertainable set of future outcomes
against which investments can be made. From this perspective, thoughtful
innovation policy can be viewed as, essentially, tweaking the uncertainty
reduction devices to provide optimal encouragement.
This is not to suggest that all of the uncertainty reduction mechanisms
described below were necessarily designed specifically for that purpose.
They may have primary goals to benefit a particular group (for example,
safety regulations that protect consumers). However, from the innovator’s
perspective, they all function to provide some better understanding of the
future such that the probabilities in moving ahead are more defined and
incentives function.
A. Patents Ideally Reduce the Innovator’s Uncertainty Problem
Innovation incentives provide a particular uncertainty reduction means
by clarifying the potential for return on investment for a successful
invention.122 The function, from the behavioral point of view, is the
reduction in uncertainty as to how the hard work and capital invested in
creating something new will pay off.123 In the absence of incentives,
innovators must be concerned that ideas will be appropriated by
competitors who will free-ride off of their efforts, and the uncertainty for
thwarting or delaying that competition may be enough to dissuade.124
122 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275–80
(1977) (patents function by securing a return on investment). There have been various types employed
over the years, from privileges to rewards to patent and similar exclusion devices. See, e.g.,
SCOTCHMER, supra note 2, at 3–13 (introduction co-authored with Stephen Maurer describing
government manipulation of innovation among the ancient Greeks).
123 See David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration,
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 287 (1986) (describing appropriability
regimes).
124 DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW
ECONOMIC HISTORY 154–55 (1973) (describing patents as a means of internalizing positive
externalities); Kieff, supra note 29, at 717–22 (describing the use of property rights to avoid
commercial unused because an innovator will be dissuaded from not being able to fully realize the
rewards associated with an endeavor); Cf. Lemley, supra note 29, at 1046–50 (defending the existence
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Essential to modern incentive structures is the idea of attribution to the
creator—we care who is responsible at some level. In earlier times,
ownership of information was not as clearly celebrated, and credit played a
greater role in assigning blame when something went wrong.125 If a brick
was poorly formed or a knife blade dangerously brittle, identifying the poor
craftsman with the intent of punishment was a far greater reason for
recognizing individual contributions.126 To be sure, poets and story-tellers
were recognized individually, but not with the intent of giving them space
to recapture the fruits of their efforts but rather to prevent plagiarism or
promote accurate copying.127
There is a broadening of focus, at least in European society, around
the time of the Renaissance.128 At that point, the mere awarding of
opportunities and privileges to favored individuals or guild members gave
way to means for rewarding inventors.129An important reason for this was
trade. As cities and regions traded more frequently, there was a more
obvious advantage to those who could produce better products or utilize
more efficient methods.130 Regions with such strong reputations gained
wealth, as goods became more widely traded and competition became more
robust.131 The emergence of more formal scientific thought and the
rediscovery of the achievements of the ancient world seemed to coincide.132
Among the earlier types of true invention incentive was that of contest
and reward.133 This was particularly when some great problem presented
of free-riding even in real property and explaining why some free-riding is not antithetical to
intellectual property).
125 See Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP.
265, 269–70 (1975) (describing the use of trademarks to establish a reputation for quality or assign
blame).
126 Id.
127 Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship, “Intellectual Property,” and the Origin of Patents:
Notes toward a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 846, 853–58 (1991).
128 To be sure, innovation continued from ancient times through the Renaissance, but political
disintegration and economic depression had an effect on its reporting. Lynn White Jr., Technology and
Innovation in the Middle Ages, 15 SPECULUM 141, 149–50 (1940).
129 Long, supra note 127, at 870–875; Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoter of
Competition: The Guild Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267,
1273–75 (2012).
130 Long, supra note 127, at 870–875.
131 Id.; Carlo Marco Belfanti, Guilds, Patents, and the Circulation of Technical Knowledge
Northern Italy during the Early Modern Age, 45 TECH. & CULTURE 569, 584–589 (2004) (describing
changing trade dynamics).
132 See DAVID WOOTTON, THE INVENTION OF SCIENCE (2015);
Shekhar Aiyar, Carl-Johan Dalgaard & Omer Moav, Technological Progress and Regress in PreIndustrial Times, 13 J. ECON. GROWTH 125, 127–28 (2008) (describing the phenomenon of
technological regress and rediscovery at various point in history).
133 SCOTCHMER, supra note 2, at 9–10.
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itself to a community.134 One of the most famous examples concerns the
building in Florence, Italy of what was, at the time, the world’s largest freestanding dome.135 The path to the successful construction of Florence’s
cathedral was far from certain. It was not until 1418 that a viable solution
was proposed by a genius sculptor, goldsmith and architect named Filippo
Brunelleschi in response to a contest.136 It required a massive investment in
time and intellectual effort and failure in such work was not uncommon in
communities without access to architects so skilled.137
Why did Brunelleschi, a man who was not so wealthy that he could
afford to engage in such innovation as a dalliance, agree to move forward?
The Opera of Santa Maria del Fiore held a contest, with the princely sum of
200 florens offered as a reward for the inventor/architect whose design was
chosen.138 Viewed from an uncertainty perspective, the money offered
Brunelleschi some amount of financial security if he were willing to put off
his other projects and business venture to dedicate a period of his life to
finishing the Duomo.
This story is worth considering because it gives some insight into the
shortfalls of the reward system that eventually gave way to patents.
Brunelleschi was famously concerned that the benefit from his work might
cease with the reward payment if he secured no other protection.139 His
typical solution was to rely on secrecy to ensure that he would remain
sought after for such work, rather than someone who might copy his
designs and techniques.140 However, during the building of the Duomo,
Brunelleschi faced a logistics problem that required a solution that could
not be kept secret due to its open nature. In order to ship massive amounts
of marble from Carrera, he wanted a more advanced transport mode. Thus,
Brunelleschi created a large, river going ship, called Il Badalone, and
petitioned and received from the Signore di Firenze one of history’s first
134 Id. at 41–47 (describing various examples of great problems and how prize systems created
incentives).
135 ROSS KING, BRUNELLESCHI’S DOME 3, 6–7 (2000); Timeline, OPERA DI SANTA MARIA DEL
FIORE,
https://operaduomo.firenze.it/en/history/timeline/centuries/1-13th-14th-centuries
[https://perma.cc/CHB4-YCP7]. The dome, which would have none of the traditional buttresses that
gothic architects would have normally employed as supports, was intended to bring glory to the city of
Florence. KATHLEEN JAMES-CHAKRABORTY, ARCHITECTURE SINCE 1400 32–35 (2014).
136 See generally Frank D. Prager, Brunelleschi’s Inventions and the “Renewal of Roman Masonry
Work”, 9 OSIRIS 457 (1950) (describing Brunelleschi’s techniques as modifications of Roman methods
as well as entirely new ideas).
137 JAMES-CHAKRABORTY, supra note 135, at 34–36.
138 Id. at 32–33; KING, supra note 135, at 37.
139 KING, supra note 135, at 41–42.
140 Pamela O. Long, Invention, Secrecy, and Theft: Meaning and Context in the Study of Late
Medieval Technical Transmission, 16 HISTORY & TECH. 223, 231–32 (2000).
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patents on a new invention.141 It is apparent that contests, secrecy and guild
protections were not sufficient to provide some certainty that Brunelleschi
could privately appropriate the benefits of his invention. Thus, the patent
was born.
In contexts such as Florentine, Italy, as well as in the Venetian
Republic, as detailed by Sichelman and O’Connor,142 the invention patent
gained traction. As with modern patents, these early rights offered no
guarantee of financial benefit. Rather, they offer the possibility of profit
through market exclusion only if consumers or other relevant purchasers
see value.143 Brunelleschi could hope only that his boat was so successful
that others would seek him out for the right to use the invention.144
To put it in the language of decision theory: from the perspective of
the innovator, modern patent law creates institutions and rules that provide
probability distributions that can be assessed in determining whether to
proceed. Broadly speaking, they set forth a limited market exclusion
system that can be valuable if the claimed invention is an important part of
a commercialized product or service. Instead of the uncertainty of secrecy,
first-mover advantage, branding or some other approach against the
countermoves of competitors, patents provide the probability distribution
associated with property rights.145 The impact is extended if one considers
Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory as a distribution related to exploiting the
invention through broader development.146 For example, Gans, Hsu and
Stern demonstrated that resolving patent uncertainty fosters commercial
relationships (e.g., licensing) necessary to expand the market for ideas.147
Underlying the general notion of patent property right protection are
the more defined and ascertainable probability distributions regarding
obtaining a patent from a patent office and enforcing it though either
contracting systems (licensing) or litigation (courts or administrative
entities in some countries). Although not guaranteed to receive a patent,
innovators can consider probabilities for outcomes within an understood
prosecution system that has very detailed rules148 and known decision141

KING, supra note 135, at 108–117.
Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 129.
143 Id. at 1274–78.
144 Unfortunately, the boat sank on its maiden voyage. KING, supra note 135, at 116–17.
145 Smith, supra note 100, at 1724–27 (“Property itself is a response to uncertainty, and property
rules derive some advantage as a response to uncertainty.”).
146 Kitch, supra note 122, at 271.
147 Joshua S. Gans, David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property
Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays, 54 MGMT. SCI. 982, 994 (2008).
148 For example, prosecution is dictated by the voluminous Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
[hereinafter MPEP]. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION
142
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makers. An applicant can estimate the likelihood of success given the field
of invention, the effort put into a prior art search, the scope of the claims,
etc.149
Additionally, probability for success in enforcement can be generally
determined with sufficient knowledge about the strength of the
infringement case, as well as the potential for an invalidity determination.150
This is not dissimilar from real property. Adam Mossoff implied in a work
criticizing the scholarship that suggests patents and real property are
incongruous that, in fact, data for real property trespass claims is likely to
have similar attributes.151 It will show an enforcement distribution that has
an ascertainable probability that is far from certain.152
One of the better works implicitly highlighting the above points is
Mark Lemely’s and Carl Shaprio’s Probabilistic Patents.153 In this piece,
the authors discuss various aspects of the patent system that cannot be
known by prospective patentees (or innovators) ex ante, using the term
“uncertainties.”154 They describe such uncertainties inherent in prosecuting
patents and being denied if the examiner finds the invention is not new or
nonobvious.155 Further, they discuss the uncertainties in litigation and the
possibility that some information will be discovered or some argument
made that renders the patent invalid.156 But critically, it is obvious that
Lemley and Shapiro are not talking about Knightian uncertainty or
ambiguity, but rather risk. This is made clear by the fact that they further
describe patents as a kind of “lottery ticket,” which is a type of risk with
known probabilities (that may be stacked against the player, but still, are
not ambiguous).157 This is something that an innovator should be able to
address, and though society may wish to change the probabilities (e.g., by
making the prosecution process more rigorous and less error prone158 or
PROCEDURE
§§ 1900–1920
(9th
ed.
8th
rev.,
2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html [https://perma.cc/686G-HBEC].
149 For a graphic depiction of how a prospective patentee might assess the variability of protection
through a probability framework, see Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability,
7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 12–14 (1992).
150 See, e.g., John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV.
2111, 2124–35 (2007) (modeling a royalty negotiation based on each party’s assessment of the
probabilities of certain outcomes and combining them into a final valuation).
151 Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1704–10 (2013).
152 Id. at 1708.
153 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75 (2005).
154 Id. at 76.
155 Id. at 77–79.
156 Id. at 80.
157 Id. at 80–83.
158 See id. at 83–85.
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eliminating the doctrine of “willful infringement” in litigation159), the
potential for ambiguity or uncertainty aversion should not rise.
Similarly, Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer have written on the benefits
of some probability rather than certainty in patent enforcement as a means
to attenuate patent power without creating significant invention
disincentives.160 They suggest that permitting uncertainty and delay in
patent enforcement determinations reduces deadweight loss by encouraging
some competitors to risk infringement until a final judgment is rendered.161
Although Ayres and Klemperer do not distinguish between risk and
unascertainable uncertainty, it seems clear that by using the term
“probabilistic” and including percentages of enforcement likelihood in their
model, they are referring to the same kind of quantifiable risk as Lemley
and Shapiro. Again, this is distinct from Knightian uncertainty or
Ellsberg’s ambiguity.
Two important points about the system’s ability to substitute
probability for uncertainty are worth noting. First, the reduction in
ambiguity is not dependent on the legal strength of the rights. In other
words, if patent rights are revised prospectively to reduce protections—for
example, by precluding enforcement of certain types of inventions162 or
making injunctions more difficult to obtain163 would not necessarily create
uncertainty or ambiguity. Patents and other incentive rules (including tax
and funding structures, in addition to property) can be adjusted to provide
greater or lesser incentives. It is entirely reasonable for a society to support
one type of innovation, such as renewable energy, and reduce support for
another type, such as coal production. All such a revision should change is
the probability distribution for the innovator related to some aspect of
patent ownership or enforcement. Even a retrospective revision, if it is clear
and static, can allow an innovator to engage is analysis closer to risk
assessment. Therefore, an argument in favor of preventing patent
uncertainty is not an argument for increased patent strength, per se. Along
the same lines of Coase’s analysis of property rights vs. liability,164 the
transaction costs of uncertainty are what is relevant, not where the property
boundaries are set.
159

See id. at 86.
Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985
(1998).
161 Id. at 993–1000 (description and model).
162 See Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Medical Method Patents and the Fifth Amendment: Do the New
Limits on Enforceability Effect a Taking?, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 147, 154–57 (1996).
163 eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
164 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 56 J.L. & ECON. 837, 850–53 (1960).
160
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Second, the uncertainty that is reduced for the innovator not only
relates to his or her own potentially patentable invention, but also the
potentially conflicting inventions of other innovators. Although one is
unlikely to know the probability distribution for blocking patents that may
arise, knowing how the system is set up for such blocking patents,
including the mechanisms in place for contracting, enforcing and
challenging related to such patents still reduces uncertainty.
B. Additional Uncertainty Reduction Mechanisms Support Innovation
The scope of uncertainty reduction related to innovation is broader
than patents. One can identify many additional mechanisms by considering
the attenuation of unknowns at different points in the innovation process.
Obviously, uncertainties impact industries differently, and may be more or
less relevant depending on whether the innovator is an individual or firm,
as well as the geography in which the activity takes place. However, the
general theme of a defined structure—a set of game rules, if you will—
rather than defined outcomes is present. Put another way, they are
institutions: norms, traditions, and legal rules and regulations that regulate
how individuals and groups interact.165 It has been noted that, “by reducing
uncertainty and, thus, the amount of information needed for individual and
collective action, institutions are fundamental building blocks in all
societies.”166
At the invention stage, one can imagine uncertainties regarding the
funding for research and the firm, limitations on study materials and rules
about handling, and sources of information to derive and solidify the
creation. The uncertainty is partially alleviated by having systems in place
for early stage funding in the form of venture capital, grants, as well as
securities rules.167 Further, regulations regarding the appropriate use of
data168 or materials169 also reduces uncertainty.
At the development stage, collaborative relationships and supply chain
sourcing becomes very important. The central nature of commitments
165

BJORN JOHNSON, INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING, IN NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: TOWARD
26 (Bengt-Ake Lundvall, ed. 2010).
166 Id.
167 Christensen, supra note 94, at 162–63 (describing how stable finance reduces uncertainty).
168 See
Eur.
Comm’n.,
2018
Reform
of
EU
Data
Protection
Rules,
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights/data-protection/2018-reformeu-data-protection-rules_en [https://perma.cc/LH8Q-DGCH] (background and basics related to the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)).
169 See Nicholas J. Diamond, The Flaws of Stem Cell Legislation: Sherley, Brustle, and Future
Policy Challenges Posed by Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 259 (2013)
(discussing potential of stem cell regulation to stall research).
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elevates contracts to the fore of uncertainty reducing tools.170 The ability of
contracts to identify rights and responsibilities ensures the future will roll
out along a particular path, or compensation will be available to account for
the loss. In addition, understanding whether international conflict will add
costs to materials171 or limit their availability172 is essential for making plans
for the future.
The implementation stage benefits from less uncertainty in the event
of loss (insurance), marketing approval (regulation), and appropriate
relationships (antitrust). And it is significantly easier to negotiate when
uncertainty related to market exclusion—the ability to keep competitors
away from assists—is reduced.173 This ability is critically linked to
property. As Hernando De Soto described in his highly regarded book, The
Mystery of Capital, property law serves an essential function in ensuring
market actors can establish the economic potential of assets, integrate
information, make assets fungible and protect transactions.174 The
predictability of property law—which includes the social commitment to
the system—reduces the costs of dealing with the extra-legal protection and
underground transactions that must accompany informal ownership.175
Knowing this protection exists permits innovators to allocate costs to other
aspects. And, of course, the failure to protect existing property rights
entails the classic problem of takings or expropriation of property.176 A firm
is much less likely to invest in a manufacturing facility in a country in
which such private property is subject to nationalization.177 As suggested
above, the impact of reduced property incentives is relevant to innovators
whether in the realm of physical or intellectual.178
170 The economics literature suggests that ambiguity-averse individuals prefer incomplete
contracts. Sujoy Mukerji, Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 1207, 1221–22 (1998).
171 See Kyle Handley & Nuno Limao, Trade and Investment Under Policy Uncertainty: Theory and
Firm Evidence, 7 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 189 (2015) (providing a methodology for assessing the
impact of trade policy uncertainty).
172 See Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129, 141–43
(2016) (assessing the impact of § 1502 conflict mineral disclosure rules).
173 See Gans, Hsu & Stern, supra note 147, at 994.
174 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 47–62 (2000).
175 See id. at 162–63.
176 See generally Mojtaba Dani & Afshin Akhtar-Khavari, The Uncertainty of Legal Doctrine in
Indirect Expropriation Cases and the Legitimacy Problems of Investment Arbitration, 22 WIDENER L.
REV. 1, 1–4 (2016) (discussing investment risk in dealing with the uncertainty of expropriation law
across the world).
177 See id.
178 There is an academic debate regarding to what extent patents are to be analogized to tangible
property rights. Compare Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical
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Additionally, the general nature of stable legal rules is particularly
important. Whether securities law, regulatory interpretations or
patentability qualifications, uncertainty creeps into the system when stable
interpretations do not exist.179
III. CATEGORIZING NEW UNCERTAINTY
Despite the existence of an apparently well-designed innovation
incentive system, something has clearly gone wrong. As properly framed
from a behavioral perspective, the problem of uncertainty should be overall
reduced by modern patent law. Instead, there are complaints and concerns
that innovators and firms are more confused than ever.180 Some even argue
for abolishing patents altogether.181 Is there something institutionally
misaligned in the system, or fundamentally corrupt?
The simple answer is, intellectual property systems are, by their
nature, dynamic.182 New uncertainties arise from new technologies and
evolving societies. Patent systems must evolve. Early protection regimes
focused on machines, but now they must envelop software and DNA.183
However, uncertainty must be managed along with the change, lest
additional unknowns arise that have a strong aversive effect. Gone
sufficiently awry, the system itself may turn actors away from policies

Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 720 (2007) (arguing that patents
are not only property, but constitutionally protected private property), with Lemley, supra note 29, at
1053–55 (noting that intellectual property is largely concerned with an under compensation problem,
whereas real property is a “response to allocative distortions resulting from scarcity”). This assessment
is relevant even with a weaker definition of patent property. See Oil State Energy Svs., LLC v. Greene’s
Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1377 (2018) (holding that patents convey only the specific form
or property right known as a “public franchise”).
179 See D’Amato, supra note 28, at 6. In an interesting work differentiating between narrow rules
and broad standards, John Duffy argues that the latter have been proven to be significantly more durable
over time. John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 609, 638–39 (2009). Such a distinction should not change the present analysis, as stability is as
important in applying standards as it is in setting forth defined rules.
180 See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text.
181 See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 3, 4–7 (2013) (presenting the case that no studies definitely establish that patent systems
encourage productivity growth and suggesting that society might be better off without them).
182 See Hylton, supra note 17, at 1144–48 (describing dynamic uncertainties in the patent system
that are influenced by the political economy of those with power desiring a change in the rules).
183 Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in the
Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 784–96 (2008) (providing a historical perspective on the
initial purpose of patent law as having a basis in the economic theories of the Enlightenment); Peter S.
Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s
Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63
STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1294–96 (2011) (reflecting on the narrow, physical limits of the original
interpretation of “art” and natural principles under the patent act).
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intended to generate societal benefits, like public disclosure of
inventions.184
Of course, every new uncertainty is not a mole that needs to be
whacked. As discussed, innovation in the patent system inherently has
unknowns, and some uncertainty is actually beneficial. So how do we know
what areas to target? For example, how do we know if an innovator in the
position of Francesco Pompei is frustrated by a particular uncertainty in the
patent system or if he has simply lost his bet on an ascertainable probability
of protection? One may presume that something other than increased risk is
creating a problem, but what is the dividing line? A categorization legal
and regulatory uncertainty is necessary to delineate issues for reform.
Recall that two of the factors most likely to foster ambiguity or
uncertainty aversion are a lack of competence about the nature of the future
decision and the potential for that future decision to retroactively impact
sunk costs or investments.185 Such a situation may exist when a decision
involving a legal or regulatory problem must be made wherein an
individual has no knowledge about a consequential future rule, but such a
rule has the potential to impact retroactively impact an existing investment.
In this situation, it is reasonable to prefer a path that may avoid the
innovation (say, focusing on other innovations, prioritizing secrecy over
patents, etc.). However, if either factor is not present, it is less likely that
uncertainty aversion will occur.
This situation exists quite prominently when a critical legal test—a
rule that would normally establish the probability of an outcome—is not,
and apparently will not, be set forth in sufficient detail or clarity to allow
one to make an informed assessment.186 Perhaps a more concrete rule will
be applied to the innovator at some point in the future, but there is no way
to know initially what it will be. Essentially, the innovator has no way of
predicting how the law will be decided by a court or agency. It is akin to
buying a lottery ticket and not knowing how many numbers, or perhaps
even letters, will be used to determine the winner. As De Soto described in
the context of contracts and private property in the developing world,
knowing that a property system will still exist and how it will work in the
future is a very important factor.187 Although an endeavor may involve high
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See Daniel R. Cahoy et al., Fracking Patents: The Emergence of Patents as InformationContainment Tools in Shale Drilling, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279, 293–95 (2013)
(describing the traditional disclosure role of patents); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 539, 546–54 (2009).
185 See FIG. 1 and accompanying text, supra at 25.
186 D’Amato, supra note 28, at 6.
187 DE SOTO, supra note 174, at 162–63.
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risk, consistent rules are necessary to provide the grounding for properly
evaluating that risk.
Exacerbating the impact of the uncertainty is if the eventual clarity
will come only after costs are sunk and some ownership is gained from an
early use of the test. It would be as if an innovator were compelled to return
the winnings from the lottery ticket after winning, when a second round
simply changed the contest rules and mooted the earlier result. Applying
the observation that people are averse to losing what they already
possess,188 watching such a game play out could create a disincentive.
Under such conditions, it would only be natural for an innovator to be
inclined to choose another path with less uncertainty, even if the
probabilities of success are low.
If we add on top of this uncertainty the possibility that others will play
the game and end up with rights that conflict with the innovator’s eventual
products or services, the negative impact is even more enhanced. These are
essentially random roadblocks placed in the way of innovators. Not only
would one want to avoid the particular ambiguous protection path, but
perhaps one would avoid participating in the field altogether.
Uncertainty of exactly this sort exists in the context of the test for
patentable subject matter in the United States. The fact that some confusion
is finally shaking out of the system due to the growing number of
decisions189 does not completely ameliorate the negative effects. An
understanding of how this rule likely negatively impacted innovation
choices versus other, less ambiguous rules, is instructive. On the other
hand, uncertainty that exists in other legal contexts, such as obviousness
standards and rules for fee shifting, does not create the same concerns. An
understanding of how these examples fit in the investment/competency
matrix offers an explanation for the distinction and provides a roadmap for
reform.
A. Investment Killing Uncertainty: Patentability
Perhaps no other topic in patent law has elicited as much ink as the
question of what can be patented. It obviously is important from a public
policy standpoint, as a serious debate has raged regarding the extent to
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See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text.
Consider, for example, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s comprehensive spreadsheet of
patent eligibility decisions, which lists the basic facts and outcomes of 107 Federal Circuit decisions
decided since the Alice case. Chart of Subject Matter Eligibility Court Decisions, USPTO (Feb. 1,
2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-sme_crt_dec.xlsx,
available
at
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility
[https://perma.cc/XU4H-6UT9] (under the heading “Other materials”).
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which particular technology advances are encouraged or discouraged with
patents.190 And it is relevant to technology historians, who may look to the
evolution of patenting to track the evolution of technology.191 However, it is
arguably most important to those operating in innovation environments
because it is the critical cutoff to this particular path for protection.
Innovators may change their behavior and shift what they are doing
depending on the availability of patent protection;192 thus, the rules are
important.
In recent years, uncertainty was injected into the test for patentability,
and there has been significant consternation in the intellectual property
community.193 Although issues have arisen in many countries (e.g., the
patentability of software is debated in countries subject to the European
Patent Office194), it has become a focal point of concern about the patent
system in the United States. As a context for uncertainty impacts, it is
useful to consider the U.S. specifically, but the comments below should be
relevant in many other countries.
Patentability issues arise in the U.S. patent system at two broad time
periods. During the prosecution (agency process for initial patent
examination), an objection as to appropriate subject matter can be raised by
the examiner.195 An applicant has the opportunity to rebut, and if successful,
may obtain a patent if all of the other hurdles related to novelty,
190 Two articles by Professor Risch humorously bookend the broad debate. Compare Michael
Risch, Everything Is Patentable,
75
TENN.
L.
REV.
591
(2008),
with
Michael
Risch, Nothing Is Patentable, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 45 (2015). In addition, seminal articles on particular
technologies have contextualized the debate in many areas. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary
Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) (biotechnology
patents); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999) (business methods
patents); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (software patents). Professors Burk and Lemley have
discussed whether the question is inherently distinctive depending on the technology in question. See
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific? 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155
(2002).
191 See generally Gerardo Con Diaz, Embodied Software: Patents and the History of Software
Development, 1946–1970, 37 IEEE ANNALS OF THE HIST. OF COMPUTING, no. 3, 2015, at 8 (arguing
that the history of software patenting and embodied software are inseparable).
192 Czarnitzki & Toole, supra note 14, at 151–53 (arguing that if patents are available, certain
uncertain paths become more viable).
193 For various references discussing patentable subject matter, see articles and text, supra note 19.
Some practitioners have been so concerned that they have developed blogs to track the impact of
subject
matter
uncertainty.
See,
e.g.,
BilskiBlog,
FENWICK
&
WEST,
https://www.bilskiblog.com/alicestorm/ [https://perma.cc/QA3B-2JG9].
194 Susan Marsnik & Robert E. Thomas, Drawing a Line in the Patent Subject-Matter Sands: Does
Europe Provide a Solution to the Software and Business Method Patent Problem?, 34 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 227, 227 (2011).
195 MPEP § 2103.
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obviousness and proper disclosure are surmounted.196 The second time
period is post-grant. A subject matter challenge may arise as a defense to
infringement in litigation197 or during an agency review process,198 the
nature of which depends on the timing.
The test for patentability during either prosecution or post-issuance
review is based in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which sets forth the categories of
patentable inventions as “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter,” as well as improvements.199 That
language is broad and longstanding,200 though the U.S. Patent Office has
identified signals, device profiles and paradigms as being excluded by the
literal language.201 The 2011 revisions to the Patent Act additionally
excluded claims directed to human organisms.202 This plain statutory
framework is broad and not tremendously controversial in what it cuts out.
However, as early as the 1850s, the courts have read in additional
restrictions that have been maintained through common law precedent.203
O’Reilly v. Morse (1853) was an early articulation of the concept that
patents claiming broad, preemptive concepts rather than inventions (in that
case, electromagnetism) were not valid.204 In the ensuing years, there were
occasional cases dealing with the need to demonstrate inventiveness, but it
was not until the 1970s, alongside the increasing prominence of software,
that restrictive doctrine truly began to take shape.205 Even then, a rejection
or invalidation based on subject matter was still relatively rare until the
Supreme Court outlined a much more general rule in a 2012 case, Mayo v.
Prometheus.206 Considering claims involving a method of administering
thiopurine, the Court declared that its precedents “insist that a process that
196

Id.
Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 78–81
(2013) (describing the invalidity defense in court).
198 Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 278–82 (2016) (detailing
the PTO’s systems of review after granting a patent: post-grant review, inter partes review, and covered
business method review).
199 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
200 With the first Patent Act of 1790, Congress defined the subject matter of a U.S. patent as “any
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or
used.” Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
201 MPEP § 2106.03.
202 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011).
203 LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth;
an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right.”).
204 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–20 (1853).
205 Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard of
Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1799–1801 (2014).
206 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
197
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focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a
combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’
sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the natural law itself.”207
Following Mayo was the case that arguably is most responsible for the
current uncertainty. This is, in part, because it disproportionately impacts
important areas of technology, but primarily because of the unclear test it
provided. In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank,208 the Supreme Court endeavored to
resolve a truly confusing set of opinions accompanying a per curium result
from an en banc hearing of the case at the Federal Circuit.209 The case
involved patents for mitigating settlement risk through the use of a shadow
record of accounts.210 In considering whether the claimed invention was too
abstract, the Supreme Court drew upon its decision in Mayo to fashion
what has become known as the Alice two-step.211 First, a court is to
“determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible
concept[s],” and second, a court must “consider the elements of each claim
both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the
additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patenteligible application.”212 Abandoning previous technical rules, Alice opened
the patentability question to the uncertainty of either a court’s or factfinder’s determination of concepts like “abstract,” “transform” and
“conventional.”213
In the wake of Alice, practitioners, courts and the PTO have worked to
put together a coherent outline of what this case requires. The PTO’s
efforts are a good example of the uphill battle an interpreter faces. The
agency has put forth several guidance documents that consist primarily of
different examples of what seems to be eligible and what is not based on

207

Id. at 72–73.
573 U.S. 208 (2014).
209 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
210 This invention is well represented in one of the patents termed “representative” by the Court.
U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (issued Oct. 19, 1999).
211 Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217–22.
212 Id. at 217.
213 See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366–68 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (describing prior
cases where the court found an invention to be abstract and noting the fact-finder’s role in determining
what constitutes routine or conventional activity insufficient to transform an invention into something
more). The complexity of the post-Alice analysis was noted in a concurrence to the Federal Circuit’s
denial of an en banc rehearing of the Berkheimer decision. 890 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(Lourie, J., concurring) (“We now are interpreting what began, when it rarely arose, as a simple § 101
analysis, as a complicated multiple-step consideration of inventiveness (‘something more’), with the
result that an increasing amount of inventive research is no longer subject to patent.”).
208
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court decisions.214 Most illustrative are the PTO’s charts of decisions
holding claims eligible215 and overall subject matter eligibility decisions.216
Thus, the best one can do is try to match an invention after reviewing all of
the examples and hope a court finds a similar connection. This is a task that
is difficult for an attorney, let alone a lay innovator. During a December
2016 Roundtable held by the USPTO, Mark Lemley summed up the
challenge. He noted that the inherent style of “analogic reasoning” is
problematic for non-lawyers because “it doesn’t provide us with
particularly useful rules.”217 Rather, it appears “[w]e’re doing it by looking
at a kind of estimate of how technological the invention is.”218 Professor
Lemley pointed out that the courts do in the end seem to be getting to the
right point from a policy perspective,219 but this does not dispel the ex-ante
uncertainty faced by an innovator.
To be sure, there is a reasonable debate on how broad subject matter
should be. The Committee Report accompanying the 1952 Patent Act
suggests that Congress intended patentable subject matter to include
“anything under the sun that is made by man[.]”220 But others have argued
that patents need to be constrained to avoid an excess of monopoly power
or preemption.221 Perhaps Alice and subsequent precedent have simply
moved the line to something more restrictive. How do we know that
patentability analysis presents an uncertainty problem rather than a new
choice for more narrow standards?
The simplest indication that the post-Alice world is uncertain is that
similar types of inventions are treated differently depending on how a
particular court (or appellate panel) views either abstraction or additional
inventive activity. The example of Francesco Pompei’s patents presents a
case in point. A patent applicant or owner does not know what standards
will apply and how those might fit with earlier arguments the innovator
214

Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-andregulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility [https://perma.cc/XU4H-6UT9].
215 Decisions holding claims eligible, USPTO (July 23, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patent/lawsand-regulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility [https://perma.cc/XU4H-6UT9] (under
the heading “Other materials”).
216 Chart of Subject Matter Eligibility Court Decisions, supra note 189.
217 Roundtable on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO, 50 (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/RT2%20Transcript%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3SP-MBCX].
218 Id. at 50–51.
219 Id. at 49.
220 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 44 (1952).
221 See Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH L. REV.
1858, 1862–73 (2014) (describing economic theories for limiting patentable subject matter, though
ultimately concluding an underlying moral basis underlies rejections).
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may have made. At the 2016 USPTO Roundtable, Marian Underweiser of
IBM stated about the patentability jurisprudence:
These cases use an [ends-justify-the-means] analysis and they are thus
inconsistent with each other and provide no reliable rules that can be used to
predict outcomes going forward.
This is the hallmark of failed jurisprudence. Judges have no faith that applying
the test will yield what they believe should be the proper outcome, so they
bend the test to suit their desired result. Step two becomes step one,
preemption matters, and then it doesn’t.
This is judicial anarchy aimed directly at groundbreaking technology.222

This is not simply a complaint that the standards are too narrow, but
specifically that they are undeterminable. Importantly, this is uncertainty in
the words of an innovator.
Even the judiciary sees an uncertainty problem as they attempt to
apply responsible doctrine in patent cases. Writing in dissent in a recent
infringement case involving a patent covering a manager for unused
capacity of a display device, Judge Plager stated, “There is little consensus
among trial judges (or appellate judges for that matter) regarding whether a
particular case will prove to have a patent with claims directed to an
abstract idea, and if so, whether there is an “inventive concept” in the
patent to save it.”223 This view is openly shared by colleagues such as Judge
Linn224 and Judge Lourie.225
Objectively, as well, is the evidence that there are swings in subject
matter standards that seem based on individual whims rather than
comprehensive policy. There is the fact that the courts have not been
consistent in identifying the source of the rules, at times acting as
textualists and looking to the breadth of the statute as opposed to finding
common law restriction.226 More directly, there is the fact that subject
matter substantially increased as a basis of rejection in both litigation and
Patent office proceedings in certain arts (such as e-commerce) after Alice.227
222

Roundtable on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, supra note 217, at 406–07.
Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
224 Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Linn,
D., dissenting) (declaring that the Supreme Court’s subject matter test is “indeterminate and often leads
to arbitrary results”).
225 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Lourie, A., concurring) (stating
that patent eligibility law “needs clarification by a higher authority, perhaps by Congress”).
226 Duffy, supra note 179, at 622.
227 See
Mark
Nowotarski,
Surviving
Alice
in
the
E-Commerce
Arts,
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2017/05/surviving-alice-in-the-e-commerce-arts.html
[https://perma.cc/6S6W-XTZW] (chart showing allowance rates in work groups 3620 and 3680 dipping
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Attempts at reform to reduce § 101 uncertainty is, of course, on the
policy table. Under Director Iancu, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
issued new guidelines that attempt to cabin the analysis somewhat.228
However, there is no guarantee that this analysis will be reflected by the
courts because it is not binding.229 Still, indications are that rejections in the
PTO have decreased since Director Iancu’s appointment.230 In addition,
Senator Christopher Coons and Thom Tillis have circulated draft
legislation that would eliminate “implicit or other judicially created
exceptions to subject matter eligibility,” leaving the courts to rely on the
text of the statute and the U.S. Constitution as the only limitation.231
However, there is opposition to such reform, and it is unclear whether
uncertainty will actually be impacted by a change to the Patent Act.232
What all of this means from the perspective of innovators in certain
fields, such as software and life sciences, is that patentable subject matter is
by over 60% post-Alice); Colleen Chien & Jiun Ying Wu, Decoding Patentable Subject Matter, 2018
PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 1, 17 (2018) (“On balance, the data confirm that 101 is playing an
increasingly important role in the examination of software and medical diagnostics patents.”).
228 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 53 (Jan. 7, 2019).
The guidance limits the potential for inventions to be found “abstract” by enumerating categories of
abstract concepts and stating that a rejection should follow only if the invention is “directed to” the
concept.
229 See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 Fed. Appx. 1013, 1020 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“While we greatly respect the PTO’s expertise on all matters relating to
patentability, including patent eligibility, we are not bound by its guidance.”).
230 See Dennis Crouch, Updates from USPTO Public Meeting from Aug 2, 2018, PATENTLY-O
(Aug. 2, 2018) https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/08/updates-from-uspto-public-meeting-from-aug-22018.html [https://perma.cc/3NQH-NRKS] (reporting updates from public meeting showing that under
Director Iancu, eligibility rejections have dropped from 8% to 6.6% of all rejections).
231 On May 22, 2019, a bipartisan, bicameral bill was proposed which could redefine what kinds of
inventions may be patented. If enacted, the bill will remove the judicial exceptions to patent eligibility.
This draft bill arrives on the heels of the USPTO’s revised guidance on patent eligibility that went into
effect on January 7, 2019 and feedback from stakeholders, inventors, and industry representatives from
an earlier draft in April. Thom Tillis, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers
Release
Draft
Bill
Text
to
Reform
Section
101
of
the
Patent
Act,
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-releasedraft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act [https://perma.cc/669Q-PVYU] (effectively
abrogating any judicially created exception to patent-eligibility, and thereby, overturning the Mayo,
Myriad, and Alice decisions).
232 See Shubha Ghosh, A Fitter Statute for the Common Law of Patents, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 1,
2019) https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/08/fitter-statute-patents.html [https://perma.cc/QU3V-Y548]
(describing opposition from the ACLU and several other organizations as well as constitutional
concerns with constricting the power of courts to create common law exceptions to patent eligibility);
see also Dennis Crouch, Confusing a Stylized H, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 4, 2019),
https://patentlyo.com/patent?w=31 [https://perma.cc/UZ2F-9FMF] (arguing that the draft not only fails
to resolve any of the issues it purports to resolve, but also, it likely will take the state of the U.S. patent
system to a time of even greater uncertainty regarding patent eligibility and arguing that defining
“useful” to include essentially any invention or discovery that was developed through human
intervention will likely reinvigorate the argument that human genes are patent-eligible).
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an uncertainty minefield. Importantly, it does not matter if, as Professor
Lemley suggested, we can determine post-hoc that courts seem to be
making policy-aligned, or well-reasoned decisions. If an innovator has no
basis for assessing the future probabilities of that “right” decision, it does
not resolve the uncertainty.
Put in terms of uncertainty impact, the current state of patentable
subject matter is an issue on which innovators have little to no competence,
yet the future determination will certain impact investment in the future
(see Figure 2).
FIG. 2: IMPACT OF CURRENT PATENT UNCERTAINTY

Therefore, it would be appropriate to categorize subject matter
uncertainty as highly problematic, and very ripe for reform.
B. If-Then Uncertainty: Obviousness
If extant uncertainty imposed upon otherwise informed inventors
elicits concern, substantially less sympathetic is the innovator that creates
his or her own uncertainty. If such an individual has the option of a
relatively safe and more predictable path, but instead voluntarily moves in
a direction with unascertainable probabilities, this “if, then”233 uncertainty
seems self-imposed. Particularly if the innovator has made such a choice
233 The “if, then” statement is a concept in conditional or rule-based computer programming
languages. See Frederick Hayes-Roth, Rule-Based Systems, 28 COMM. OF THE ACM 921, 922–23
(1985) (containing examples of “if, then” programming language). It tells the computer to take a path
“if” certain conditions are met. It is used here as an analogy: if an innovator makes choices that create
certain conditions, then that innovator can expect more or less uncertainty.
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for the potential of great gain, we have less of a societal inclination to offer
more protection, as the adoption of enhanced uncertainty was self-imposed.
In fact, this is exactly the kind of inclination toward unknown futures that
Knight noted should be rewarded by his definition of “profit.”234 With the
choice factor, such uncertainty is not negative in its impact on incentives
for the innovation process; winners and losers are likely willing to accept
their fates similar to a casino gambler.
A straightforward example of “if, then” uncertainty exists in the law
of patent non-obviousness or inventive step. This is a patentability standard
that ensures an invention constitutes a significant enough technological
contribution to deserve rights of exclusion.235 In U.S. patent law, Section
103 of the Patent Act requires rejection if the “differences between
the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the [application’s]
effective filing date [ . . . ] .”236 Essentially, the law ensures that trivial
advances that are merely predictable variations in existing technology,
judged from the viewpoint of those of ordinary skill in the art, are
considered part of the public domain and not subject to capture.237 Nonobviousness exists separately from subject matter as a requirement, and has
traditionally been important in erecting a barrier to “bad” patents.238
The assessment of non-obviousness is made with reference to the
patent application’s claims.239 The reviewing body (Patent Office or court)
considers all of the available prior art and determines whether the
combination renders the claimed invention obvious.240 To make a prima
facie case of such obviousness, there must be a motivation to combine the
teachings of the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.241 Without such
a motivation, it is too easy to combine disparate ideas that no inventor
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KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 271.
Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study,
16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 715–16 (2013).
236 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
237 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007); Merges, supra note 149, at 12–14.
The ideal outcome of the obviousness requirement is that we will be less likely to grant rights to
inventions that would have been created even in the absence of the patent incentive. See generally
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L. J. 1590
(2011) (making the case that the “inducement standard” should be even more emphasized in the law).
238 See Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical
Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2067–69 (2007) (detailing the reputed
link between obviousness and patent quality).
239 MPEP § 2141; Merges, supra note 149, at 18.
240 MPEP § 2141.
241 Insite Vision Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 783 F.3d 853, 859 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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would reasonably consider or otherwise engage in hindsight analysis.242 But
how to judge this motivation is an inherently difficult problem that has
evolved over the years.243 In the last part of the 20th century, the Federal
Circuit engaged in an effort to add certainty to the analysis by creating the
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation test” (“TSM test”), which required
evidence of a reason to combine references.244 The Federal Circuit’s efforts
were ultimately undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., which tossed out the TSM test as the sole
measure of whether one of ordinary skill in the art would combine
references.245 The KSR decision opened up the sources that a reviewing
body can use to find the motivation to combine, and left more discretion to
the district court.246
Due to the renewed flexibility in the obviousness analysis, there is
now more uncertainty in predicting future outcomes.247 But, importantly,
this does not necessarily mean that innovators will be more disinclined to
patent. When it comes to claims that are likely to raise an obviousness
issue, the patent applicant actually has a great deal of control. It is a
fundamental understanding of claim drafting that the applicant’s language
determines the scope of the grant.248 A prospective patentee can choose
broad claims that are likely to include more prior art and trigger an
obviousness challenge, or narrow claims that could be untouched but have
a more limited scope of protection.249 The reward for broad claims is, of
course, more patent protection. Therefore, if a patent applicant makes the
choice to reach for more exclusionary power, the additional uncertainty he
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Id.
See Rantanen, supra note 235, at 717–22 (providing an overview of obviousness jurisprudence).
244 See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (detailing standard and accompanying rationale), abrogated on other grounds.
245 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). The Court’s decision corrected the
Federal Circuit’s overly rigid test from a philosophical standpoint, but also responded to complaints that
the TSM test made it too likely that bad patents would issue. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note
238, at 2064–65 (noting criticism of the Federal Circuit’s test, including in recent reports on the state of
the U.S. patent system).
246 Rantanen, supra note 235, at 721–22 (noting that the exact boundaries of the resulting test are
not clear).
247 See, e.g., Adam Powell KSR Fallout: Questions of Law Based on Finding of Fact and the
Continuing Problem of Hindsight Bias, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 243, 246–50 (2009) (asserting
that the Supreme Court injected more uncertainty into the determination by introducing a more flexible
standard to be applied by district courts).
248 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 848–49 (1990) (observing that a patentee will claim something broader than a
specific form disclosed in an invention, though the practice is limited at its outer boundaries by the
enablement doctrine).
249 Id. at 845–49 (describing the implications of choosing broad versus narrow claims).
243

42

17:1 (2019)

Patently Uncertain

or she faces might be a reasonable exchange. It may even be welcome in
that risk averse competitors will be disincentivized.
Framing this within the impact bi-matrix described above250, we would
say that the uncertainty in obviousness would create less of an aversion
because the applicant has competence about the innovative quality of the
invention (see Figure 2). Such competence may be bolstered by the
development of so-called “secondary considerations,” which establish that
the invention enjoyed commercial success, satisfied a long-felt need or
solved a problem that others could not.251 Even if there is the potential for
impact subsequent to significant investment (e.g., when a court considers
obviousness in a litigation), the impact is likely to be substantially less than
an unpredictable subject matter knock-out.
With this view in mind, policymakers should not attempt to eliminate
all uncertainty in obviousness determinations. Not only is it unlikely to be a
disincentive to invent, but it may actually propel the most innovative.
Although the test can drift to total unpredictability, as it stands,
obviousness uncertainty is an important opportunity for Knightian profit.
C. Remedial Uncertainty: Fee-Shifting
Even if one accepts that uncertainty is not always negative and can
offer opportunities to savvy innovators, one might ask whether it ever can
have overall positive effects. In other words, are there sources of
uncertainty that can be said to promote innovative behavior, regardless of
risk preferences? If such sources disincentivize bad behavior that thwarts
innovation, the answer is yes. When rules can be gamed by the
unscrupulous, ambiguous standards for punishment may reduce the
temptation to test the system as one can never determine for certain when
the hammer will fall. If this uncertainty does not conflict with the
competence/investment framework above, it is reasonable to assume the
overall effect is positive. The concept of such good uncertainty is perfectly
illustrated by the law of fee-shifting in U.S. patent litigation.
Fee shifting is a mechanism that exists in patent and other forms of
intellectual property litigation that upends the traditional system of
allocating costs in order to punish a party that has engaged in bad behavior.
The traditional expense allocation in the U.S., as with other civil contexts,
is the “American Rule,” which states that each side pays its own costs.252
250

See FIG 2.
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
252 See Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010) (“Our basic point of
reference when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the
American Rule: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract
251
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This is in contrast to the so-called, “English Rule,” common outside the
United States, which mandates that the loser pay the winner’s costs.253 Also
known as “fee shifting,” the English Rule exists as a principle of fairness
and way to ensure that the expense of litigation does not subsume the
benefit of winning.254 Conversely, the American Rule is more policy driven,
serving as an economic tool for encouraging legitimate, but close lawsuits
that might otherwise be forgone if one faced the risk of accounting for the
other side’s costs.255
U.S. courts have long-imposed the English Rule of fee shifting as a
punishment in a variety of litigation contexts.256 This is particularly true in
intellectual property law.257 In patent law, fee-shifting was codified in
1946258 and incorporated in a revised form in the Patent Act of 1952.259 The
current rule, Section 285, states that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”260 It has been left to
the courts to define “exceptional,” but it has been traditionally applied in
cases where either the plaintiff brings an infringement litigation in “bad
faith” and without proper basis, or where a defendant engaged in willful
infringement.261

provides otherwise.” (internal quotations omitted)). See generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of
the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1984)
[https://perma.cc/67FV-JR5A].
253 Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 46–47 (1984).
254 Id.
255 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (The
American Rule promotes broad access to the courts by not penalizing a party “for merely defending or
prosecuting a lawsuit.”).
256 For a comprehensive review of the legislative history of patent fee shifting, see Daniel R. Cahoy
& Lynda J. Oswald, A Serendipitous Experiment in Percolation of Intellectual Property Doctrine, 95
IND. L. J. (forthcoming 2019). See also John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation:
The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1588 (1993); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK,
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES (4th ed. 2012).
257 For example, the Copyright Act allows for fee shifting in a fairly broad set of cases. 17 U.S.C.
§ 505 (2012) (“In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of
full costs by or against any party other than the United State or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise
provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as
part of the costs.”). Fee shifting is also explicitly permitted in patent, federal trade secret, and federal
trademark contexts as well. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (addressing fee-shifting in trademark actions);
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D) (2012) (addressing fee-shifting in civil trade secret misappropriation
actions); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (addressing fee-shifting in patent actions).
258 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946).
259 Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–
376).
260 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
261 See Cahoy & Oswald, supra note 256.
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The key uncertainty factor in fee shifting arises from the fact that bad
actors cannot fully predict when it will catch and penalize them.262 Because
a court has the discretion to determine if a certain act is exceptional, a party
has an incentive to behave, lest their actions be fit to the statutory language.
The flexibility telegraphs that the test will be outcome determinative.
Conversely, if a party had a strong sense of exactly what type of behavior
would trigger fee shifting, that party could push the boundaries. It could
engage in problematic behavior up to the point of penalty. In the end,
uncertainty is a threat that compels a party to err on the side of respectful
behavior. In turn, this promotes innovation, because market actors can be
more assured that litigation will serve as an appropriate vehicle for
addressing disputes, rather than a sword for those who would manipulate
the system.263
To see that the above narrative is more than theoretical, consider that
there has actually been an opportunity to observe how uncertainty in fee
shifting positively impacts the innovation environment. The fee shifting
statute in the Patent Act had been interpreted with a level of flexibility and
deference by the courts since its enactment through the creation of the
Federal Circuit in 1982.264 A variety of circumstances could qualify as
exceptional under the law.265 That flexibility ended with the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., in
which the court determined that fee shifting could be applied outside of
litigation misconduct only when the case was both (1) brought in
“subjective bad faith,” and (2) “objectively baseless.266 This had the effect
of severely narrowing the types of cases subject to the rule, and rendered it
a relatively empty threat. As a result, fee-shifting awards were quite rare.267
Concurrently, concerns about abuse of the patent system from
frivolous litigations brought by so-called, “patent assertion entities,”
arose.268 Some openly flouted a negative litigation model, in which low
quality patents were asserted against financially weak defendants for

262 Douglas Y’Barbo, On Fee-Shifting and the Protection of Copyright, 44 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 23, 54–55 (1996) (noting that uncertain fee-shifting schemes can impact litigation behavior).
263 Moreover, uncertainty will dissuade those with weak cases from litigating in the first place,
potentially reducing litigation overall. D’Amato, supra note 28, at 16–17.
264 See Cahoy & Oswald, supra note 256, at 23.
265 Id. at 21.
266 Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailer Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
267 Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 325, 377 (2012) (finding
that between 2005 and 2011, fee-shifting awards were granted in 56 cases per year out of 3000 patent
cases filings per year).
268 Daniel R. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald, Complexity and Idiosyncrasy at the Federal Circuit, 19
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 216, 238–39 (2018).
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nuisance settlements.269 Although one might be inclined to challenge such
behavior, the Federal Circuit’s narrow interpretation of Section 285
ensured that fee-shifting would not be the available mechanism. In essence,
the fact that a statutorily broad and ill-defined rule was curtailed reduced
the uncertainty that would have otherwise disincentivized bad behavior.
The U.S. Supreme Court reinvigorated the beneficial uncertainty in
two paired cases: Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,270
and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc.271 In
Octane Fitness, the Court found that the Federal Circuit’s test was “rigid
and mechanical” in a way that belied the intent of the statute.272 Instead, the
Court held that the term “exceptional” was to be interpreted according to its
ordinary meaning, which meant that the case simply “stood out from
others.” In Highmark, the Court followed up with the holding that a district
court’s finding on exceptionality could be reviewed only for abuse of
discretion.273 In the wake of the Octane and Highmark cases, fee shifting
awards rose significantly.274
The behavioral result of the Supreme Court’s stripping down of fee
shifting doctrine to a district court’s interpretation of the term
“exceptional” is the creation of an effective deterrent; a litigant cannot fully
know what kind of bad behavior will fit and will be more cautious.
Although there are some acts that are more likely to fit, such as willful
infringement,275 the outer boundaries are unclear. The uncertainty in the test
creates an incentive to avoid any allegation that behavior creates an
exceptional case. And the less abusive the litigation system is, the more
innovators will believe it serves a legitimate enforcement function that is
safe to interact with. In the context of fee shifting, uncertainty enhances the
remedial purpose of the law. Conversely, uncertainty in fee shifting does
not create aversion because it relates to acts that are in the impacted
litigant’s control, implying competency. Also, the uncertainty arises in

269 See, e.g., David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2013, https://nyti.ms/16zhcwh [https://perma.cc/R9QB-GKJS] (profile of Erich Spangenberg, owner
of patent assertion entity, IPNav).
270 See generally, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc, 572 U.S. 545 (2014).
271 See generally, Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559 (2014).
Highmark and Octane were argued before the Court on the same day and decided on the same day
(April 29, 2014), but were separate cases.
272 Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 550.
273 Id. at 554.
274 Scott M. Flanz, Octane Fitness: The Shifting of Patent Attorney’s Fees Moves into High Gear,
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 329, 358 (2016) (finding a significant increase in the granting of fee shifting
motions post-Octane).
275 Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 550.
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close proximity to the acts that trigger it (litigation behavior). Innovationfriendly policy and no aversion equates to a positive effect.276
Thus, a behavioral perspective on intellectual property fee-shifting
uncertainty suggests that reform is not only unnecessary, it could have a
broadly negative impact on innovation. So long as the uncertainty does not
stray beyond capturing bad behavior, it is positive.
IV. ADDRESSING PATENT UNCERTAINTY
Once “investment-killing” uncertainty in the law is identified, as in
the case of patentable subject matter, policymakers and innovators have
available several possible avenues of response. The easiest is to refrain
from action, and simply permit negative impacts to reduce the power of
incentive systems like patents to induce innovative behavior. Another is to
undertake direct legal or regulatory action to eliminate or substantially
reform the uncertain rule. Finally, society can place the burden on firms to
use internal capacities to foresee and prepare resources to confront or
capture opportunities. In the real world, some combination of all of these
responses will take place. But society’s strongest hand is with direct legal
and regulatory revision, and such action should be considered when
important innovation is most likely to be affected.
A. Uncertainty Aversion Should Not Substitute for Innovation Policy
Do nothing is always the easy option. And in the case of patent
incentives, there is an arguable justification. If the above uncertainty
simply weakens patent rights, innovators will be pushed toward other
choices like secrecy.277 Those who believe that the patent system does not
make a positive contribution278 may find this is one way of reducing its
influence. This, however, appears to be the minority position.
More realistically, it is possible to consider the effect of uncertainty
aversion on innovative behavior as merely one of a number of possible
policy levers that are constantly being pulled.279 The most explicit might be
patent and trademark fees in the United States, which are progressive and
provide significant breaks for “micro entities” and “small entities.”280 Such
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Moser, supra note 13, at 1231.
278 E.g., Boldrin & Levine, supra note 181.
279 See Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1661–62 (2003). See also Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 160 (calling for at least the use of increased
risk as a policy lever).
280 See USPTO Fee Schedule, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-andpayment/uspto-fee-schedule [https://perma.cc/FJ9Z-XSLL].
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fee delineations clearly make it easier for some to obtain rights more than
others, and this policy probably shapes innovation in some way. The same
should be true for any differential expense that treats certain inventions or
individuals differently. How is uncertainty or ambiguity different?
Theoretically, it could be just another lever.
The primary distinction is that unascertainable uncertainty is a
scattershot approach. It is not directed policy and has unknown and
unintended effects. It is possible that it will impact some slice of innovation
that would have otherwise ended up being critical for some future field.
Although explicitly picking winners and losers in the innovation game
through policy is dangerously presumptive,281 at least stakeholders
generally have some ability to participate in the debate (such as in the
federal rulemaking context282). If not explicit, then we may trust the market
and the wisdom of the consumers.283 However, viewed as irrational decision
making, uncertainty aversion has none of these intended benefits.
At its most base level, aversion is a cost that may simply end up as a
blunt penalty on those with more limited funding. There is recent research
indicating that in concentrated industries, patent ownership is shifting to
larger firms.284 One explanation is that these firms are increasingly better
innovators, and there are technical barriers to entry.285 But a contributing
factor might be that small innovators in ambiguously protected industries
are averse to inventing or commercializing inventions. Such an impact may
mean that innovation of particular interest to small entities may be
decreased.

281 Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637, 640
(2013) (noting that one of the reasons the U.S. has chosen a patent system over a reward system is to
“decentralize the task of picking winners”).
282 Rulemaking,
USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/rulemaking
[https://perma.cc/8EH9-TJJA].
283 See generally James Surowiecki, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004) (describing the power of
group participation over managed decision-making). Moreover, Peter Lee argues that the patent
system’s cribbed focus on individual invention misses many social innovations, further suggesting that
wielding patent policy to direct innovation is misguided. Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1, 42 (2014).
284 See Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More
Concentrated?
(Working
paper
No.
19-41,
2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2612047
[https://perma.cc/SE5U-FUPN]; Jason Douglas, Jon Sindreu & Georgi Kantchev, The Problem with
Innovation: The Biggest Companies are Hogging All the Gains, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2018.
285 Grullon, Larkin & Michaely, supra note 284, at 40.

48

17:1 (2019)

Patently Uncertain

B. Legal and Regulatory Revision with Care
The revision route is intensive in terms of political expense,286 but it
has the greatest potential for reducing negative uncertainty impacts. If one
can focus specifically on what aspect is uncertain, reform may be possible
that restores the proper role of intellectual property rights. Such an effort
requires broad participation from stakeholders and negotiation.287 But the
resulting rules may be clearer and more broadly acceptable than those
generated by courts that prioritize doctrinal consistency and conservative
statutory interpretation.
Of course, there are significant risks to reform as well. It is possible
that any revision will not sufficiently resolve uncertainty problems or even
raise new ones. To be sure, if a bright line is set, the Coasian argument is
that efficiency will result if obstacles to bargaining are sufficiently low.288
But setting that bright line is much easier in theory than in practice.
Perhaps the only way to avoid this is to cut a problematic rule, either in
effect or in total.
This can happen at the administrative level.289 Taking patentable
subject matter as an example, the U.S. intellectual property community has
watched with some relief as Director Iancu took steps in 2018 to
deemphasize section 101 considerations in many patent cases. In remarks
delivered at the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) 46th
Annual meeting, Director Iancu stated the PTO had crafted guidance that
would eliminate section 101 considerations in many cases.290 That guidance
issued in 2019.291 Specifically, the PTO will not find a claim abstract unless
it is “directed to” one of three categories: mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human interactions, and mental processes.292 Even if
a claim references one of the three categories, it is not directed to one if it
286 Although patent reform has occurred over the years, with the most recent major change being
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 2011 (Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 325 (2011)),
wholesale revision is rare. Consider that the United States is still operating under the Patent Act of
1952.
287 See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1341, 1347–50 (2009) (noting that patent reform is strongly influenced by political institutions,
which are in turn influenced by stakeholders).
288 Coase, supra note 165, at 15–19.
289 See generally David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(describing how the PTO reacts to political pressure to change its procedures in order to effectuate new
policy).
290 Andre Iancu, Director, USPTO, Intellectual Property Owners Association 46th Annual Meeting,
(Sept. 24, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-directoriancu-intellectual-property-owners-46th-annual-meeting) [https://perma.cc/M63L-9K7D].
291 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, supra note 228.
292 Id. at 50.
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integrates it into a practical application.293 By cutting off the possibility of a
subject matter analysis for some percentage of cases, the potential for
uncertain results is greatly reduced.
A stronger reform would be to rewrite or curtail an uncertain rule so
as to eliminate the possibility that any connected, uncertain assessment
would be imposed. Again, with regard to patentable subject matter, there
are many legislative proposals that would eviscerate section 101. A
prominent example is the so-called, “Coons-Tillis draft bill,” which would
add a definition of “useful” that requires “human intervention” and
eliminate “judicially created exceptions to subject matter eligibility.”294
Such a change, if enacted, would abrogate the uncertain case law resulting
from the Alice decision.
Broadly eliminating an uncertain rule or law can obviously have
negative innovation consequences if the rule provides some important
standard that is necessary for the efficient functioning of the system.
Policymakers must exercise caution, and perhaps consider the lightest hand
possible in changing the rules. Even in the context of patentable subject
matter, it can be argued that rigorous section 101 analysis prevents some
bad patents from issuing.295 The fact is, other patentability standards—
novelty, non-obviousness, enablement, etc.296—remain in place to serve as
a barrier to make reduction of 101 less problematic. But the debate on the
impact of revision on overall innovation policy is critical.297
C. Firms Must Develop Internal Competencies to Identify and Ameliorate
Uncertainty
Regardless of what does or does not happen at the level of legislative
or administrative reform, firms should prepare. As the literature evinces,
some firms are able to innovate in the face of uncertainty or ambiguity and
others are slowed.298 The successful firms seem to be capable of strategic
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Tillis, supra note 231.
295 See, e.g., David Swetnam-Burland & Stacy O. Stitham, Patent Law 101: The Threshold Test as
Threshing Machine, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 134, 138–44 (2013) (articulating the pre-Alice
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296 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (2012).
297 In the end, some form of polycentric governance is likely to influence reform. As articulated by
famed economist Elinor Ostrom, property resource management and allocation are not best
accomplished by the government using rational actor theory, but rather individuals and institutions
acting at multiple levels. See Elinor Ostram, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of
Complies Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641, 663–64 (2010).
298 See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
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foresight beyond that of their competitors. An ideal system of uncertainty
management should support and encourage firm action.
At least two approaches appear to be important in moderating negative
uncertainties: (1) creating a structure that is capable of flexibly responding
to a variety of unknowns; and (2) investing in the production of additional
information. Unfortunately, these options are generally resource-intensive.
As a result, it may be that in innovation contexts, harmful uncertainties
have a greater impact on individuals or small firms.
A well-regarded management process originating from the U.S.
military is the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA)
framework.299 Emerging from the aftermath of World War II, when the
military was compelled to take on a more complex role amidst a rapidly
changing global political environment, VUCA provided a strategic tool for
risk management.300 Essentially, VUCA is a risk and uncertainty
identification tool that aids in the analysis of future events.301 It provides
perspective on the potential pitfalls of particular actions and theoretically
permits more informed decision making and preparation.302 Theoretically,
VUCA-like analysis should be useful to entrepreneurs.303 As noted above,
the more information one has, the less likely one will be dissuaded by
uncertainties.
A different technique has been promoted by many, including the
RAND Corporation, for addressing deep factual uncertainties such as the
impact of climate change.304 In situations where the underlying mechanisms
of future events are so poorly understood, there is utility in conceiving of
multiple future realities and planning against them. This is the idea
underlying the scenario building.305 By playing out multiple futures, more
valuable or consequential paths can be identified.306 Scenario building has

299 Oliver Mack & Anshuman Khare, Perspectives on a VUCA World, in MANAGING IN A
VUCA WORLD, 5–6 (Oliver Mack et al. eds., 2016); Robert C. Bird, VUCA, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
367, 371–72 (2018) (defining VUCA).
300 Mack & Khare, supra note 299, at 5.
301 Bird, supra note 299, at 371.
302 Id.
303 See id. at 418.
304 Making Good Decisions Without Predictions: Robust Decision Making for Planning Under
Deep Uncertainty, RAND CORP. (2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9701.html
[https://perma.cc/PU6B-2WZE].
305 See Robert J. Lempert, David G. Groves, Steven W. Popper & Steven C. Bankes, A General,
Analytic Method for Generating Robust Strategies and Narrative Scenarios, 52 MGMT. SCI. 514, 519
(2006) (describing a scenario generator).
306 Id.
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been suggested in the context of product innovation307 and intellectual
property regimes.308
Although VUCA and scenario building exercises provide useful
mechanisms for generating more information, to actually deal with
uncertainty, the integration of a flexible adaptation system may be
necessary. David Teece has written extensively on the topic of innovation
and is known for his work elucidating the characteristics of firms that are
better able to compete in the marketplace.309 He noted that flexibility in
resource allocation and the ability to respond to unexpected situations is
important for success.310 Teece refers to these attributes as “dynamic
capabilities,” which he categorizes as those directed to “sensing, seizing
and transforming” in the face of new information.311 These are opposed to
“ordinary capabilities,” which are directed to efficiency and the status
quo.312 Discussing specifically the topic of uncertainty in innovation, Teece
notes that bolstering dynamic capabilities allows a firm to change direction
quickly and meet unknown challenges.313 Essentially, a firm should be like
a boxer ready to bob and weave in the face of a competitor’s punches
instead of merely running more quickly in one direction.
Both of the above techniques make a firm more prepared, but they
offer no guarantees that some surprising future consequence will not be
debilitating. Moreover, since only some resource-rich firms typically
prepare at this level to tackle uncertainty, it cannot entirely address the
societal impact. For that, a broader policy response is called for. And
indeed, institutions have evolved to better address harmful uncertainties
and permit innovators the space to succeed.

307 James Derbyshire & Emanuele Giovannetti, Understanding the Failure to Understand New
Product Development Failures: Mitigating the Uncertainty Associated with Innovating New Products
by Combining Scenario Planning and Forecasting, 125 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 334, 334
(2017).
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(2007),
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/63A726D28B589B5BC12572DB00597683/$Fi
le/EPO_scenarios_bookmarked.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMA9-8YP2].
309 Teece (1986), supra note 123 (highly influential article connecting innovation with strategy);
David J. Teece, Reflections on “Profiting from Innovation”, 35 RES. POL’Y 1131 (2006) (refining and
updating research from 1986 article).
310 David J. Teece, The Foundations of Enterprise Performance: Dynamic and Ordinary
Capabilities in an (Economic) Theory of Firms, 28 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 328, 341 (2014).
311 Id. at 332.
312 Id. at 330–32.
313 Teece & Leih, supra note 58, at 9–10.
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CONCLUSION
Debates regarding the structure and benefits of patent systems, the
proper articulation of their rules, and the potential for disparate domestic
and global impact are long-standing. However, the role of true uncertainty
as a supporting or undermining player in innovation system incentives is
understudied. Although superficial assessments have deemed uncertainty
problematic, a deeper dive into the factors that impact innovator behavior
demonstrates that there can be neutral or positive effects as well. A more
sophisticated understanding is necessary to identify areas for reform and
guide innovators or investors.
A behavioral economics perspective highlights an innovator’s
perceived competency about future events and potential for investment loss
as the key factors influencing uncertainty impact. Using this guidance to
review the current state of the law, one can see that three categories of legal
uncertainty present themselves to inventors: (1) investment-killing; (2) ifthen; and (3) remedial uncertainly. Only the first creates a problem that
must be addressed by legal reform; the others should be preserved as
aspects of a healthy innovation system. If policymakers and firms employ
this new typology in considering legal uncertainty, we are likely to move
toward a more acceptable and powerful innovation system.
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